



TECHNOLOGY
SOURCE
S M A R T . S P E E D . S O L U T I O N S

Iraq National PKI

Code Signing CA

Certificate Practice Statement

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1 Introduction

The present document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) describing the certification practices that apply to Technology Source (hereinafter, TS) Code Signing CA. This CPS complies with the TSP Certificate Policy that is applicable to the provision of certification services offered by Trust Services Providers (TSP) issuing publicly trusted certificates to end-entities under the Iraq National PKI Root CAs in the republic of Iraq.

This CPS addresses the technical, procedural, and organizational policies of the Code Signing CA that are established and operated by TS under the Iraq national PKI hierarchy, with regards to the complete lifetime of certificates issued by this CA.

This CPS covers the issuance and controls surrounding the following types of certificates issued by Code Signing CA:

- **Code Signing Certificates** - certificates issued to legal persons to sign libraries, exe, msi files etc...
- **OCSP responder certificate** – certificates for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder to sign OCSP responses related to certificates issued by the Code Signing CA.

This CPS complies with the formal requirements of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC 3647 with regards to format and content. While certain section titles are included according to the structure of RFC 3647, the topic may not necessarily apply in the implementation of the TS Code Signing CA. Such sections are denoted as “Not applicable”. Additional information is presented in subsections of the standard structure where required.

Technology Source PKI Governance Board is committed to maintain this CPS in conformance with the current versions of the below requirements published at <http://www.cabforum.org>:

- Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
- Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates

If there is any inconsistency between this document and the requirements above, the above requirements take precedence over this document.

The CPS is public. Wherever confidential information is referenced herein, the text refers to classified documentation that is available to authorized persons only.

Further information with regards to this CPS can be obtained from the TS PKI GB, using contact information provided in clause 1.5.

1.1 Overview

The Iraq National PKI is established under Information & Telecommunication Public Company (ITPC) with multiple root CAs representing national root PKI program. With this National PKI, the Iraqi Government aims to provide a framework to facilitate the establishment of Trust Service Providers (TSP) offering digital certification and trust services to government and non-government entities. The Iraq PKI hierarchy has two levels described as following:

Level 0:

The below five (5) Roots Certification Authorities (CA) are established for the different types of certificates to be issued. The Information & Telecommunication Public Company (ITPC) is responsible for this Root CA layer. As the national PKI governance body, the ITPC is mandated to operate the Policy Management Authority (PMA). ITPC Root CAs¹ are:

- **Iraq Code Signing Root CA:** certifies/signs Code Signing Subordinate CAs.
- **Iraq S/MIME Root CA:** certifies/signs email protection Subordinate CAs.
- **Iraq TLS Root CA:** certifies/signs TLS Subordinate CAs.
- **Iraq Document Signing Root CA:** certifies/signs natural & legal persons document signing Subordinate CAs.
- **Iraq Timestamp Root CA:** certifies/signs Timestamping Subordinate CA.

Level 1: The TS's Subordinate CAs falls at this level within the National PKI hierarchy as shown in the below figure :



Figure 1 Iraq National PKI hierarchy

¹ For code signing certificates, only the Iraq Code signing Root CA is relevant since it signs the Code signing Subordinate CA certificate of Technology Source. Other Root CAs belongs to the Iraqi PKI but aren't pertinent to code signing certificates issuance and are not included in the Code signing hierarchy as depicted in Figure 1.

Technology Source is the organization to operate the Subordinate CAs and offer related trust services to the government and non-government domains. As such the Technology Source operates as a Trust Services Provider (TSP) offering its services through a hierarchy of Subordinate CAs, implemented under the ITPC Root CAs. ITPC Root CAs certified TSP Subordinate CAs² for Technology Source as follows:

- **Technology Source Code Signing CA:** Subordinate CA that issues certificates to sign the software libraries, .jar files, .exe file, .msi files etc.
- **Technology Source S/MIME CA:** Subordinate CA that will issue certificates for email signing and encryption.
- **Technology Source TLS CA:** Subordinate CA that will issue web server TLS organization validation (OV) certificates.
- **Technology Source Document Signing NP CA:** Subordinate CA that will issue document signing certificates to natural persons (citizens and employees).
- **Technology Source Document Signing LP CA:** Subordinate CA that will issue document signing certificates to legal persons (Non government and government entities).
- **Technology Source Timestamping CA:** Subordinate CA that will issue TSA certificates involved in document signing and code signing.

The above use cases are key enablers of digital transformation as they represent the corner stone of securing electronic transactions. Supporting these use cases under a unified trust model with government assurance, facilitates adoption, enables interoperability, and enhances user trust.

The TS PKI GB interacts closely with the ITPC PMA to maintain conformity with this CPS in relation to the certification and operations of the TS Subordinate CAs.

1.1.1 Technology Source PKI Governance Board (TS PKI GB)

The Governance board governing the Technology Source PKI (including the Code Signing CA) is referred to as the TS PKI GB. The TS PKI GB comprises the necessary functions including policy, security, compliance and legal that are required to provide strategic direction and continuously supervises the TS PKI operations.

The TS PKI GB is particularly responsible to:

- Define and maintain the TS PKI strategy,

² For code signing certificates, only the TS code signing CA is pertinent, as it will issue code signing end-entity certificates. Other subordinate CAs belong to the Technology Source PKI but are not relevant for code signing certificate issuance and are not part of the code signing hierarchy as depicted in Figure 1.

- Define the TS PKI services and approve its delivery model,
- Define and maintain the TS PKI Policies and Practices,
- Conduct regular supervision activities on the TS PKI operations team,
- Approve PKI budget, and take major commercial decisions,
- Approve major changes on the PKI infrastructure,
- Approve key ceremonies, and allocate internal/external auditors as required,
- Get involved in major incidents, and take decisions as required,
- Lead the resolution of disputes arising out of or related to the activities of the TS PKI,
- Evaluate incidents where key TS PKI staff/personnel did not respect the security and/or operational procedures, including ethics.

1.2 Document Name and Identification

This document is titled “**Technology Source Code Signing CA Certificate Practice Statement**” which is identified by the OID **2.16.368.1.2.1.1** and referenced in related documents as [TS CS CA CPS].

The Code Signing CA includes the above mentioned OID in the CP extension of the certificates they issue to indicate compliance with the current requirements.

1.3 PKI Participants

1.3.1 Certification Authorities

The TS Code Signing CA (hereinafter, CA) is owned and operated by a Technology Source through its premises in Iraq. This CA has been approved by the ITPC and signed by the Iraq Code Signing Root CA, as depicted in Figure 1 (section 1.1).

This CA provides the following certification services:

- **Certificate Generation Service** — it issues end-entity certificates based on the verification conducted by the Registration Authorities.
- **Dissemination Service** — it disseminates OCSP, CRL and CA certificates and makes them available to relying parties. This service also makes available any public policy and practice information to Subscribers and relying parties.
- **Revocation Management Service** — it processes requests and reports revocation data for determining the appropriate action to be taken. The results of this service are available through the certificate validity status service.
- **Certificate Validity Status Service** — it provides certificate validity status information to relying parties based upon certificate revocation lists and an OCSP responder service. The status information always reflects the current status of the certificates issued by this CA.

1.3.2 Registration Authorities

A Registration Authority (RA) is the entity that performs the identification and authentication of certificate applicants for end-user certificates, initiates, or forwards revocation requests, and approves applications for certificate issuance and renewal on behalf of the CA.

Technology Source operates its own RA function and does not rely on Delegated Third Parties for RA functions. The RA function primarily processes Code Signing certification requests for certificates issued to the legal organizations.

The RA function falls within the PKI operations structure and responsible for identity validation and certificate request management for the government and non-government entities.

TS RA function includes but not limited to:

- Authenticating, approving, or rejecting certificate application and revocation requests,
 - Identify subscribers as per the naming conventions defined in this CPS, so that each subscriber is uniquely and unambiguously identified,
 - Process certificate issuance and revocation requests with this CA based on validated and approved requests,
 - Creating and maintaining an audit-log journal that records all significant events related to the RA's operations,
 - Providing selective access to audit-log journal records as specified in this CPS,
 - Implementing other operational controls as specified in this CPS
- Processes and stores information according to the requirements defined in this CPS (particularly, in section 5).

1.3.3 Subscribers

Subscribers of the Code Signing CA are Iraqi Legal entities, including Iraqi government, non-government entities, and even Technology Source itself, failing under the Iraqi jurisdiction. For any certificate, the subscriber signs or ratifies a subscriber agreement to establish agreement on the terms and conditions as set forth by Technology Source.

1.3.4 Relying Parties

Relying Parties must consistently refer to Technology Source's Certificates Validity Status Services (i.e., CRL and OCSP), prior to relying on information featured in said certificate.

1.3.5 Other Participants

Other Participants include:

- The ITPC PMA is the supervision authority responsible for supervising the entire activity of the licensed TSP (i.e., Technology Source). The roles and responsibilities of PMA are described in the ITPC Root CP/CPS published at: <https://pki.itpc.gov.iq>
- Qualified independent WebTrust auditors who verifies the requirements set out in section 8.2.

1.4 Certificate Usage

1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses

The certificates issued by this CA can be used to:

1. **Certificates for Legal Persons (Iraqi government and non-government entities):**
 - a) **Code Signing Certificates:** to sign libraries, exe, msi files etc.
2. **OCSP Responder Certificate** – used to sign the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses for certificates issued by the Code Signing CA.

1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses

Subscribers are authorized to use their certificates for the purposes specified in section 1.4.1 of this CPS. The use of certificates for any other purposes is strictly prohibited.

1.5 Policy Administration

1.5.1 Organization Administering the Document

This CPS document is administered by the TS PKI GB according to its operating model and based on as needed interaction with the ITPC PMA.

1.5.2 Contact Person

Requests for information on any inquiry associated with this CPS should be addressed to :

Technology Source PKI Governance Board
Technology Source,
Baghdad-Four streets- nearby AL-maamon high school
Email: muhanad.ali@techsource.iq
Phone no.: +9647726695600 / +9647842002124

The TS PKI GB accepts comments regarding this CPS only when they are addressed to the contact above.

Certificate Problem Report

Subscribers and Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties may report suspected Private Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to Certificates by sending email to Info@techsource.iq

TS will validate and investigate the revocation request before taking an action in accordance with section 4.9.

1.5.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for The Policy

Based on the compliance audits' results and recommendations, The TS PKI GB determine the suitability and applicability of this CPS. This CPS is approved by the TS PKI GB and by the PMA as well, since it must ultimately comply with the provisions of the TSP CP.

1.5.4 CPS Approval Procedures

The TS PKI GB, along with the PMA, formally approves any new version of the CPS.

Dedicated personnel with PKI policy experience from the TS PKI GB review this CPS for the initial draft and subsequent changes to ensure consistency with the best practices implemented and with TSP CP prior to TS PKI GB approval. Amendments may take the form of a document containing an amended version of the CPS or an update notice. Changes made to this CPS will be tracked in the revision table.

The new CPS version will then be submitted to the PMA for ultimate approval, as it must ultimately comply with the provisions of the TSP CP.

To maintain credibility and promote trust in this CPS and better correspond to accreditation and legal requirements, the TS PKI GB reviews this CPS at least annually and may make revisions and updates to policies as it sees fit or as required by other circumstances.

Prior to becoming applicable, the updated version of the CPS is announced in the repository as available on: <https://pki.techsource.iq>

Upon published, the updated version is binding on all Subscribers, including Subscribers and parties relying on Certificates issued under a previous version of the CPS.

1.6 Definitions, Acronyms and References

1.6.1 Definitions

Applicant: The natural person or Legal Entity that applies for (or seeks renewal of) a Certificate. Once the Certificate issues, the Applicant is referred to as the Subscriber. In the context of this CPS, this CA issues certificates only to legal entities.

Applicant Representative: A natural person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant: (i) who signs and submits, or approves a certificate request on behalf of the Applicant, and/or (ii) who signs and submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant, and/or (iii) who acknowledges the Terms of Use on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA. In the context of this CPS, the applicant representative is in charge of submitting certificate requests and certificate revocation requests on behalf of the applicant. The words Applicant representative and requester are used interchangeably.

Anti-Malware Organization: An entity that maintains information about Suspect Code and/or develops software used to prevent, detect, or remove malware.

Application Software Supplier: A supplier of software or other relying-party application software that displays or uses Code Signing Certificates, incorporates Root Certificates, and adopts these Requirements as all or part of its requirements for participation in a root store program.

Attestation Letter: A letter attesting that Subject Information is correct written by an accountant, lawyer, government official, or other reliable third party customarily relied upon for such information. In the context of this CPS, attestation letters are signed by Human Resource teams of government entities.

Audit Period: In a period-of-time audit, the period between the first day (start) and the last day of operations (end) covered by the auditors in their engagement. (This is not the same as the period of time when the auditors are on-site at the CA)

Audit Report: A report from a Qualified Auditor stating the Qualified Auditor's opinion on whether an entity's processes and controls comply with the mandatory provisions of these Requirements.

CA Key Pair: A Key Pair where the Public Key appears as the Subject Public Key Info in one or more Root CA Certificate(s) and/or Subordinate CA Certificate(s).

Certificate: An electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a public key and an identity

Certificate Data: Certificate requests and data related thereto (whether obtained from the Applicant or otherwise) in the CA's possession or control or to which the CA has access.

Certificate Management Process: Processes, practices, and procedures associated with the use of keys, software, and hardware, by which the CA verifies Certificate Data, issues Certificates, maintains a Repository, and revokes Certificates.

Certificate Policy: A set of rules that indicates the applicability of a named Certificate to a particular community and/or PKI implementation with common security requirements.

Certificate Problem Report: Complaint of suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to Certificates.

Certificate Revocation List: A regularly updated time-stamped list of revoked Certificates that is created and digitally signed by the CA that issued the Certificates.

Certification Authority: An organization subject to these Requirements that is responsible for a Code Signing Certificate and, under these Requirements, oversees the creation, issuance, revocation, and management of Code Signing Certificates. Where the CA is also the Root CA, references to the CA are synonymous with Root CA.

Certificate Beneficiaries: All Application Software Suppliers with whom the CA or its Root CA has entered into a contract for distribution of its Root Certificate in software distributed by such Application Software Suppliers and all Relying Parties who reasonably rely on such a Certificate while a Code Signature associated with the Certificate is valid.

Certification Practice Statement: One of several documents forming the governance framework in which Certificates are created, issued, managed, and used.

Certificate Profile: A set of documents or files that defines requirements for Certificate content and Certificate extensions in accordance with Section 7 of the Baseline Requirements. e.g., Section 7 of this CPS provides a list of the certificate profiles defined within it.

Code: A contiguous set of bits that has been or can be digitally signed with a Private Key that corresponds to a Code Signing Certificate.

Code Signature: A Signature logically associated with a signed Code.

Code Signing Certificate: A digital certificate issued by a CA that contains a Code Signing EKU.

Declaration of Identity: A written document that consists of the following: 1. the identity of the person performing the verification, 2. a signature of the Applicant, 3. a unique

identifying number from an identification document of the Applicant, 4. the date of the verification, and 5. a signature of the Verifying Person.

Control: “Control” (and its correlative meanings, “controlled by” and “under common control with”) means possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to: (1) direct the management, personnel, finances, or plans of such entity; (2) control the election of a majority of the directors; or (3) vote that portion of voting shares required for “control” under the law of the entity’s Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration but in no case less than 10%.

Country: Either a member of the United Nations OR a geographic region recognized as a Sovereign State by at least two UN member nations.

Cryptographic Token: A USB cryptographic device certified as conformant with FIPS 140 Level 2 or equivalent.

CSPRNG: A random number generator intended for use in cryptographic system.

Delegated Third Party: A natural person or Legal Entity that is not the CA, and whose activities are not within the scope of the appropriate CA audits, but is authorized by the CA to assist in the Certificate Management Process by performing or fulfilling one or more of the CA requirements found herein.

Expiry Date: The “Not After” date in a Certificate that defines the end of a Certificate’s validity period.

Government Entity: A government-operated legal entity, agency, department, ministry, branch, or similar element of the government of a country, or political subdivision within such country (such as a state, province, city, county, etc.).

High Risk Certificate Request: A Request that the CA flags for additional scrutiny by reference to internal criteria and databases maintained by the CA, which may include names at higher risk for phishing or other fraudulent usage, names contained in previously rejected certificate requests or revoked Certificates, names listed on the Miller Smiles phishing list or the Google Safe Browsing list, or names that the CA identifies using its own risk-mitigation criteria.

Issuing CA: In relation to a particular Certificate, the CA that issued the Certificate. This could be either a Root CA or a Subordinate CA.

Key Compromise: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person or an unauthorized person has had access to it.

Key Generation Script: A documented plan of procedures for the generation of a CA Key Pair.

Key Pair: The Private Key and its associated Public Key.

Legal Entity: An association, corporation, partnership, proprietorship, trust, government entity or other entity with legal standing in a country's legal system.

Object Identifier: A unique alphanumeric or numeric identifier registered under the International Organization for Standardization's applicable standard for a specific object or object class.

OCSP Responder: An online server operated under the authority of the CA and connected to its Repository for processing Certificate status requests. See also, Online Certificate Status Protocol.

Online Certificate Status Protocol: An online Certificate-checking protocol that enables relying-party application software to determine the status of an identified Certificate. See also OCSP Responder.

Private Key: The key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used to create Digital Signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key.

Public Key: The key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify Digital Signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key.

Public Key Infrastructure: A set of hardware, software, people, procedures, rules, policies, and obligations used to facilitate the trustworthy creation, issuance, management, and use of Certificates and keys based on Public Key Cryptography.

Publicly-Trusted Certificate: A Certificate that is trusted by virtue of the fact that its corresponding Root Certificate is distributed as a trust anchor in widely-available application software.

Qualified Auditor: A natural person or Legal Entity that meets the requirements of Section 8.2.

Random Value: A value specified by a CA to the Applicant that exhibits at least 112 bits of entropy.

Registered Domain Name: A Domain Name that has been registered with a Domain Name Registrar.

Registration Authority (RA): Any Legal Entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of subjects of Certificates, but is not a CA, and hence does not sign or issue

Certificates. An RA may assist in the certificate application process or revocation process or both. When “RA” is used as an adjective to describe a role or function, it does not necessarily imply a separate body, but can be part of the CA. In the context of this CPS, the RA function is operated by Technology Source.

Reliable Data Source: An identification document or source of data used to verify Subject Identity Information that is generally recognized among commercial enterprises and governments as reliable, and which was created by a third party for a purpose other than the Applicant obtaining a Certificate. In the context of this CPS, the Iraqi Incorporating or Registration Agency is the reliable data source for non-government entities in Iraq and the Iraqi official Gazette is the reliable data source for government entities.

Reliable Method of Communication: A method of communication, such as a postal/courier delivery address, telephone number, or email address, that was verified using a source other than the Applicant Representative.

Relying Party: Any natural person or Legal Entity that relies on a Valid Certificate. An Application Software Supplier is not considered a Relying Party when software distributed by such Supplier merely displays information relating to a Certificate.

Repository: An online database containing publicly-disclosed PKI governance documents (such as Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements) and Certificate status information, either in the form of a CRL or an OCSP response.

Request Token: A value, derived in a method specified by the CA which binds this demonstration of control to the certificate request. Examples of Request Tokens include, but are not limited to: (i) a hash of the public key; or (ii) a hash of the Subject Public Key Info [X.509]; or (iii) a hash of a PKCS#10 CSR.

Root CA: The top-level Certification Authority whose Root Certificate is distributed by Application Software Suppliers and that issues Subordinate CA Certificates.

Root Certificate: The self-signed Certificate issued by the Root CA to identify itself and to facilitate verification of Certificates issued to its Subordinate CAs.

Subject: The entity, or organization defined in the “Subject” field in a Certificate.

Subject Identity Information: Information that identifies the Certificate Subject. Subject Identity Information does not include a domain name listed in the subjectAltName extension or the Subject commonName field.

Subordinate CA: A Certification Authority whose Certificate is signed by the Root CA, or another Subordinate CA.

Subscriber: A Legal Entity to whom a Certificate is issued and who is legally bound by a Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.

Subscriber Agreement: An agreement between the CA and the Applicant/Subscriber that specifies the rights and responsibilities of the parties.

Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate: A Subordinate CA certificate which uses a combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings to limit the scope within which the Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional Subordinate CA Certificates.

Terms of Use: Provisions regarding the safekeeping and acceptable uses of a Certificate issued in accordance with the baseline requirements when the Applicant/Subscriber is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.

Valid Certificate: A Certificate that passes the validation procedure specified in RFC 5280.

Validation Specialists: Someone who performs the information verification duties specified by these Requirements.

Validity Period: The period of time measured from the date when the Certificate is issued until the Expiry Date.

1.6.2 Acronyms

AICPA	American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
CA	Certification Authority
CCTV	Closed Circuit TV
CICA	Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
CV	Curriculum Vitae
DBA	Doing Business As
DN	Distinguished Name
DNS	Domain Name System
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards

EID	Electronic Identity Card
EIDAS	Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Institute
HSM	Hardware Security Module
HTTP	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IPSEC	Internet Protocol Security
ISO	International Standards Organization
ITPC	Informatics & Telecommunications Public Company
IT	Information Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
PIN	Personal Information Number
PKCS#1	Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1
PKCS#7	Cryptographic Message Syntax
PKCS#10	Certification Request Syntax Specification
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PMA	Policy Management Authority
RA	Registration Authority
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (The names of the inventors of the RSA algorithm)
RTO	Recovery Time Objective
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TLD	top-level domain
TSA	Timestamping Authority
TS	Technology Source

TLS	Transport Layer Security
TSP	Trust Service Provider
UPS	Uninterruptible Power Supply
URI	Universal Resource Identifier, a URL, FTP address, email address, etc.
URL	Universal Resource Locator

2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

2.1 Repositories

The Technology Source maintains an online repository available 24 × 7 and accessible at: <https://pki.techsource.iq>

Technology Source is responsible for making available the following information to be published on its repository:

- Current and previous version of Technology Source CPSs;
- Current version of ITPC Root CP/CPS & TSP CP;
- Subscriber, LRA and relying party agreements, PKI disclosure statement, TSA CP/PS and TSA disclosure statement.
- The valid self-signed Root CA Certificates, as well as the Technology Source Subordinate CA certificates, OCSP certificates, and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) issued by the Subordinate CAs;
- Time-stamping Unit Certificates (TSU);
- Audit reports.

2.2 Publication Of Certification Information

Technology Source is the entity tasked with providing the information for publication, as outlined in section 2.1 of this document.

Technology Source publishes certificate validity status information in frequent intervals as indicated in this CPS.

The provision of the certificate validity status information is a 24/7 available service offered as follows:

- Published CRLs including any changes since the publication of the previous CRL, at regular intervals. The Code Signing CA add a pointer (URL) to the relevant CRL to Subscribers' certificates as part of the CDP extension whenever this extension is present,
- An OCSP responder compliant with RFC 6960. The OCSP URL is referenced in the AIA extension of the Subscribers' certificates issued by this CA.

2.3 Time Or Frequency of Publication

The TS PKI GB reviews this CPS at least once annually and makes appropriate changes so that the Subordinate CAs' operations remain fully aligned to the requirements listed in section 1 of this CPS.

Modified versions of the CPS and agreements (Subscriber and Relying party) are published within five days after the TS PKI GB approval.

2.3.1 CA Certificates

The Code Signing CA and OCSP certificates are published to the public repository once they are issued until they are expired or rekeyed and the new certificates are issued.

2.3.2 CRLs

TS Code Signing CA maintain and publish CRLs as follows:

- A new CRL is generated every 24 hours, even if no changes have occurred since the last CRL issuance,
- CRL lifetime is set to 26 hours.

2.4 Access Controls on Repositories

The information published in the TS public repository is publicly available being guaranteed unrestricted access to read.

TS implements measures regarding logical and physical security to prevent unauthorized persons from adding, erasing, or modifying entries from the repository.

3 Identification and Authentication

3.1 Naming

3.1.1 Types of Names

The Subject names in the TS Code Signing CA certificate comply with the X.500 distinguished names standards. The subject name used in the CA certificate is verified and validated by the RA function of the PMA, shall be meaningful, and shall never be reassigned to another entity.

This CA are identified in the Issuer's name field of the subscriber certificates as follows:

TS CS CA Certificate

CN	TS CS CA G1
O	Technology Source
Country - "C"	IQ

Certificates issued by this CA uses Distinguished Names (DN) as specified in Recommendation ITU-T X.500 standards. The tables below specify the DN structures followed for each certificate types supported.

Code Signing Certificates issued to Subscribers:

Attribute	Value
CN	Full organization registered name
O	organization's legal name
Country - "C"	IQ
L (optional if S is present, otherwise mandatory)	name of the locality where the organization is established
S (optional if L is present, otherwise mandatory)	the province where the organization is established

Code Signing CA OCSP Responder Certificate:

Attribute	Value
CN	TS CS CA G1 OCSP
O	Technology Source
Country - "C"	IQ

3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful

The Code Signing CA enforces meaningful names to determine the identity of the organization in the subject of the certificates.

For code signing certificates issued to legal entities: names are meaningful since the CN contains a representation of the name of the organization or the entity.

For OCSP responder certificate: name is meaningful since it indicates the Subordinate CA's OCSP certificate responder name .

3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

Anonymous or pseudonymous subscribers are forbidden.

3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

The naming convention used by this CA is based on ISO/IEC 9595 (X.500) Distinguished Name (DN).

3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

For code signing certificates issued to legal entity: As per section 3.1.1 of this CPS, this CA enforces uniqueness Through a unique organization name where a representation of the entity's legal name is used.

For OCSP responder certificate: The OCSP responder unique name is included in the subject DN of issued OCSP certificate.

3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

Applicants agree by submitting a certificate request to this CA that their request does not contain data which in any way interferes with or infringes upon the rights of any third parties in any jurisdiction with respect to trademarks, service marks, trade names, company names, "doing business as" (DBA) names, or any other intellectual property right, and that they are not presenting the data for any unlawful purpose whatsoever.

This CA has the right to revoke a Certificate upon receipt of a properly authenticated order from TS PKI GB or court of competent jurisdiction requiring the revocation of a Certificate or Certificates containing a Subject name in dispute.

3.2 Initial Identity Validation

The following methods described in this Section are used to ascertain the identity of a Subscriber.

TS RA verifies and authenticates the identity and other attributes of an Applicant prior to inclusion of these attributes in a Certificate. TS RA may refuse to issue a Certificate at its sole discretion if identity validation is not successful.

3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

The Applicant provides a digitally signed PKCS#10 CSR to establish that it holds the private key corresponding to the public key to be included in the certificate. The TS RA systems enforce validation of the proof of possession of the private key as part of the certificate request processing. The proof of possession is submitted to the TS RA through CSRs in PKCS#10 format.

3.2.2 Authentication of Organization

Authentication of an organization identity is performed pursuant to current Iraqis legislation through the validation processes specified below, by which the TS RA enrolls the organization and performs initial identity validation of the organization and its representatives.

3.2.2.1 Identity

The applicant's organizational identity is verified using reliable authoritative data sources, which are expected to provide details information about the entity including the entity's legal name, address, and Authorized representative's information.

Technology Source rely on the “**Iraqi Official Gazette**” or through other directs means of communication with the entity or jurisdiction governing the entity's legal creation, existence, or recognition for the verification of government entities information and on an approved official communication with the “**Iraqi Incorporating or Registration Agency**” for non-government entities.

Technology Source may require the applicant to submit official entity documentation to confirm the identity of the subject such as corporate charter, government issued tax document, Professional letter (Accountant letter or Legal opinion), or other relevant documents and may conduct a site visit to the entity to verify the entity's address.

The TS RA verifies the association with the certificate subject by ensuring that the information provided in the application form must exactly match the information to be inserted in the certificate.

Authority of the applicant

TS RA verify the authority of the authorized representative and the certificate's requester in accordance with section 3.2.5.

3.2.2.2 DBA/Tradenname

The use of DBA or Tradename in the Subject Identity Information is not supported by this CA.

3.2.2.3 Verification of Country

The Code Signing CA issues certificates only to organizations established in Iraq. TS RA verifies that the value of the “country” field of the Subject Identity Information is set to “IQ”.

3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity

The Code Signing CA does not issue certificates to natural persons and issues only certificates for legal entities.

3.2.4 Non-Verified Subscriber Information

Every subscriber information contained within a certificate is verified by TS RA.

3.2.5 Validation of Authority

The organization’s authorized representative nominates a certificate Requester from the organization who submit the certificate management requests to the TS RA. The identity of the Requester is verified by performing the following steps as minimum:

- The TS RA conducts an identity proofing through an in-person identity verification of the Requester against his/her government government-issued ID Card. The ID card (not a copy) is presented by the Requester,
- The TS RA uses the proof of employment (Attestation letter) received as part of the certificate application to validate the association between the Requester and the entity,
- The TS RA verifies the authenticity of the certificate application and the authenticity of the attestation letter directly with the entity authorized representative. A reliable method of communication is used involving the usage of the organization email addresses, and when deemed necessary by the TS RA an in-person meeting is organized.

The authorization to request certificates on behalf of the entity is verified based on the signed certificate request form both the Requestor and the authorized representative, that attests the authority of the requestor.

3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

No Stipulation.

3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests

3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key

Identification and authentication for re-keying is performed as initial registration, in addition to the below rules:

- The TS RA checks the existence and validity of the certificate to be rekeyed and that the information used to verify the identity and attributes of the subject is still valid.
- If any of the TS terms and conditions have changed, these will be communicated by the TS RA to the subscriber.

3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-key After Revocation

Identification and authentication for re-keying is performed as in initial registration.

3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request

The identification and authentication procedures of revocation requests involves a formal request from the applicant representative of the entity to which the certificate is issued. A revocation procedure is enforced by the TS RA. It encompasses:

- The signature of a revocation request form by the authorized representative.
- The verification of the identity of the requesters against the information available to the TS RA (provided during the subscriber registration);
- Communication with the entity to provide reasonable assurances that the entity's official representative authorized the revocation operation. Such communication, depending on the circumstances, may include one or more of the following: telephone, e-mail or courier service.

Once the revocation request is successfully authenticated, TS RA revokes the subject certificate through the relevant RA system.

For OCSP responder certificate: The present CPS does not specify detailed provisions for revoking any of these certificates. Such revocation may be triggered by a compromise or suspected compromise of the related private keys which is considered as a disaster and treated as such in conformance with the TS disaster recovery and business continuity plan.

4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1 Certificate Application

4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

Applicants must comply with provisions set within the registration processes, this CP/CPS and the Subscriber Agreement.

The applicant representative is responsible for the authenticity of all data submitted as part of the certificate requests. He ensures that the certificate request is approved by signing and stamping the certificate request form and the appended subscriber agreement.

Technology Source does not issue Certificates to entities on an internal blacklist³ of organizations from whom it will not accept certificate requests. This blacklist is queried by the ITPC RA team whenever it receives any certificate request.

For OCSP responder certificate: The TS RA and an authorized PKI administrator in trusted role oversee the execution of authorized internal operational ceremonies through which OCSP certificates for the Code Signing CA are issued.

4.1.2 Enrolment Process and Responsibilities

The CAs require each Applicant to submit a Certificate request and application information prior to issuing a Certificate. TS RA authenticates all communication from an Applicant and ensures that the application form is filled and signed as expected.

- The entity's applicant representative downloads the certificate application form with the subscriber agreement from the public repository.
- The certificate application form is filed and signed by the official representative of the entity (likewise, the subscriber agreement must be ratified).
- The relevant technical team from the legal entity generates a key pair on a suitable Hardware Crypto Module conform to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 2, Common Criteria EAL 4+, or equivalent, then create a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) using the approved certificate fields in the application form (e.g. DN attributes, key size, key type etc.). This CSR is handed over to the applicant representative.
- The applicant representative authenticates to the Web RA portal (using multi-factor authentication credentials set up as part of the registration process outlined in an

³ An internal blacklist in where the TS RA logs previously rejected certificate requests due to suspected or fraudulent usage and revoked certificate requests from entities.

internal RA process document) and submits the certificate application including but not limited to the following:

- Scanned copy of properly filled and signed application form.
- The information and documents required for identification and authorization.
- Certificate Signing Request (CSR) file.

Two (02) members from the TS RA team are required to issue a code-signing certificate:

- The TS RA team reviews and validates the integrity and authenticity of all the submitted documents in addition to vetting the applicant identity as specified in section 3.2.2.
- The TS RA checks the blacklist of organizations from whom it will not accept certificate requests. This blacklist is queried by the TS RA team whenever it receives any certificate request.
- The TS RA team processes the certificate request. Refer to section 4.2.

For OCSP responder certificate: The TS RA and an authorized PKI administrator in trusted role oversee the execution of an operational ceremonies through which these certificates can be issued. The TS GB approves the operational ceremony documentation and validates the embedded certificate template and naming conventions against the provisions of this CPS. The TS PKI GB authorizes then the ceremony and confirms the list of involved trusted role staff.

4.2 Certificate Application Processing

4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

Refer to section 3.2.2 and 4.1 in addition to the following tasks performed by the TS RA:

- a) A unique ID is assigned to each certificate application record,
 - b) TS RA records all activities (e-mail communication, phone calls, vetting evidence) along with the certificate application record,
 - c) Any malicious certificate or revocation request or a request that fails multiple (more than 3) times is added to a blacklist, the blacklist includes the necessary details to avoid ambiguously in identifying future malicious requests,
 - d) TS RA conduct a blacklist check against the RA's own blacklist. If the applicant is in the blacklist, the certification application is rejected,
- a) The Requester filled-in the Organization registration form as follows:
- a. Organization Information
 - i. Organization's Legal Name

- ii. Official Address
 - iii. Main telephone number
 - b. Authorized representatives Information:
 - i. applicant representative information such as phone, official email address, position.
 - c. Requester information
 - i. Name of and contact information of the Requester (the representative authorized to submit certificate management requests on behalf of the entity).
- b) The applicant representative signed and ratifies a dedicated subscriber agreement.
- c) An attestation letter issued by the entity HR establish the association between the Requester and the entity,
- d) The Requester submitted the signed registration form, the attestation letter as well as other validation documentation to TS RA via email,
- e) The TS RA performs the following verification for each certificate request without relying on previously performed verifications:
 - Validates the organization's identity as described in section 3.2.2
 - Validate the entity authorized representative as described in section 3.2.2,
 - Verify the authorization of certificate Requestor as specified in section 3.2.5,
 - Verify the phone number of the organization by making a random call.

If all the above validations are passed, TS RA initiated a process on the Web RA Portal through which the entity and the Requester are registered on the portal based on the information collected from the Requester. At this point the requester would be able to login to the Web RA Portal and submit certificate requests on behalf of his entity.

Additionally, to the above steps, the TS RA ensures that:

- a) No one person can single-handedly validate and authorize the issuance of a code signing certificate application request.
- b) Each certificate request application is verified without relying on previously performed verifications.

The TS RA has at its disposal an internal procedure that details verification of the code signing certificate application' activity to ensure that such requests are properly verified.

For OCSP responder certificate: The TS RA and an authorized PKI administrator in trusted role oversee the execution of an operational ceremonies through which these certificates can be issued. The TS GB approves the operational ceremony documentation and validates the embedded certificate template and naming conventions against the provisions of this CPS. The TS PKI GB authorizes then the ceremony and confirms the list of involved trusted role staff.

4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

The TS RA approves an application for a certificate only if the following criteria are met:

- Successful identification and authentication of all required Subscriber information according to Section 3.2

The TS RA rejects a certificate application if:

- Identification and authentication of all required Subscriber information according to Section 3.2 cannot be completed, or
- The Subscriber fails to furnish supporting documentation upon request.

For OCSP responder certificate: A certificate application is approved by The TS PKI GB as part of the overall authorized internal operational ceremony.

4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

No stipulation.

4.3 Certificate Issuance

4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance

Once all the validation is done as described in section 4.2.1, the TS RA team uses the web RA portal to initiate certificate issuance from the TS Code signing CA based on the CSR received from the applicant.

When the certificate request is submitted to the Code Signing CA, the CA validates the format and structure of the request then generates the certificate in accordance with the configured certificate template. The certificate is then made available for download by the applicant representative. The CA issues the certificate in “Active” state so that it is ready for use once deployed on the target key-store.

For OCSP responder certificate: The TS RA oversee the execution of an authorized internal operational ceremonies through which an authorized PKI administrator in trusted role issues a direct command for the Code Signing CA to perform a certificate signing operation. The issued certificate is reviewed for correctness by the TS RA.

4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

Subscribers are notified by email from the Code Signing CA that his certificate has been generated. The certificate is made available for download to the applicant representative on his Web RA portal account.

For OCSP responder certificate: The PKI administrator is notified upon receiving the certificate from TS RA team.

4.4 Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

The Requester downloads the certificate from the web RA portal then validates its content against the certificate application/CSR. In case of any discrepancies, the Requester initiates a discussion with the TS RA which may lead to certificate revocation to issue a corrected certificate.

The certificate is deemed accepted by the organization if no complaints are raised by the Requester to the TS RA within 10 business of receiving the email notification of certificate generation.

For OCSP responder certificate: The OCSP certificate is deemed accepted once deployed on the OCSP key store as part of an authorized internal operational ceremonies.

4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA

This Code Signing CA does not publish end-user certificates apart from sharing it with the subscribers.

4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

No stipulation.

4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

The subscribers adhere to the following obligations:

- Providing correct and up-to-date information to the Code Signing CA as part of his application.
- Not tampering with a certificate.
- Only using certificates for legal and authorized purposes in accordance with the common general requirements applicable to the TSP CP and this CPS;

- Protecting the private key (and related secrets) from compromise, loss, disclosure, or otherwise from unauthorized use of their private key;
- Notifying the TS RA immediately if any details in the certificate become invalid, or as a result of any compromise, loss, disclosure, or otherwise unauthorized use;
- Not using the certificate outside its validity period, or after it has been revoked.
- No longer use the private key after the validity period of the certificate expires, or when a certificate has been revoked.

4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

A party relying on a certificate issued by the TS Code Signing CA:

- Uses software that is compliant with X.509 and applicable IETF PKIX standards to validate the certificate signature and validity period,
- Validates the certificate by using the CRL, or the OCSP validity status information service in accordance with the certificate path validation procedure,
- Trusts the certificate only if it has not been revoked and is within the validity period,
- Trusts the certificate only for its intended purpose and in accordance with this CPS.

4.6 Certificate Renewal

Not Applicable.

4.6.1 Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

Not Applicable.

4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal

Not Applicable.

4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

Not Applicable.

4.6.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Not Applicable.

4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

Not Applicable.

4.6.6 Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

Not Applicable.

4.6.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Not Applicable.

4.7 Certificate Re-Key

Certificate Re-key is the act of re-issuing a certificate for an existing subscriber with a new validity period and different public key, while the remaining information from the old certificate is duplicated in the new certificate.

Certificate re-key is supported by the Code Signing CA. The re-key process (including identity validation, certificate issuance and communication to relevant parties) is like the initial certificate application.

4.7.1 Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key

Certificate re-key may happen while the certificate is still active, after it has expired, or after a revocation. The re-key operation may invalidate any existing active Code Signing certificates.

4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

As per initial certificate issuance

4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests

As per initial certificate issuance

4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

As per initial certificate issuance

4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate

As per initial certificate issuance.

4.7.6 Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA

As per initial certificate issuance.

4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

As per initial certificate issuance.

4.8 Certificate Modification

4.8.1 Circumstance for Certificate Modification

Not applicable.

4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification

Not applicable.

4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests

Not applicable.

4.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Not applicable.

4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

Not applicable.

4.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

Not applicable.

4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Not applicable.

4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

Technology Source provides a continuous ability for subscribers to submit certificate requests. This is available through an online system that is accessible 24 x 7 to authenticated subscribers.

Certificate suspension is prohibited. Only permanent certificate revocation is permitted.

4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation

For certificates issued to legal persons (i.e. Code Signing certificate), the TS RA processes a revocation request and ensures that the Code Signing CA revokes the certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the following occurs:

1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the certificate.
2. It was discovered that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization.
3. The CA obtains reasonable evidence that the subscriber's private key, corresponding to the public key certificate, has been compromised.
4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate.
5. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed; or
6. The CA has reasonable assurance that a Certificate was used to sign Suspect Code.

The Technology Source RA ensures a certificate revocation is executed within 24 hours and revokes a certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs:

1. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 and Section 6.1.6.
2. The Technology Source RA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused.
3. The Technology Source RA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use;
4. The Technology Source RA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate.
5. The Technology Source RA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with this CPS.
6. The Technology Source RA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate.
7. The Technology Source RA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate.
8. Revocation is required by this CPS; or
9. The CA's right to issue Certificates under the requirements defined in this CPS expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Technology Source has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository.

Technology Source MAY delay revocation based on a request from Application Software Suppliers where immediate revocation has a potentially large negative impact to the ecosystem.

4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation

Revocation can be requested by the following:

- The TS RA in the cases described in section 4.9.1,
- The Subscriber may submit a revocation request for his own certificate,
- Any relying party or application software supplier possessing evidence of compromise of the subscriber's certificate or its usage to promote malware,
- Technology Source at its own discretion (if for instance a compromise is known for the CA key),

- Subscribers, relying parties, application software suppliers, and other third parties may submit Certificate Problem Reports to notify Technology Source of a suspected reasonable cause to initiate the certificate revocation process.

Only authorized revocation requests are accepted.

4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request

Revocation of certificates is done as follows by the TS RA:

1. The TS RA team assigns a unique ID to the revocation request. The TS RA records the submitted documents under the assigned ID,
2. The TS RA authenticates the requester's identity as described in section 3.4;
3. The TS RA validates the certificate revocation information (in the revocation form);
4. The TS RA performs any required investigation within the applicable time constraints (as listed in section 4.9.1 of this CPS). This may include any required communication with the certificate subscriber.
5. The RA team execute the certificate revocation,
6. TS Code signing CA revokes the certificate and the certificate status is updated⁴.
7. The TS RA notifies via email the applicant representative of the completion of the certificate revocation operation.
8. The TS RA updates his internal blacklist with the details of the revoked certificate, circumstances for revocation and based on this information, potentially change the risk profile of the applicant in the internal blacklist. Such information will be queried by the TS RA prior to processing future certificate requests for the applicant.

Certificate revocation handling by TS RA following a certificate problems reporting:

Subscribers, relying parties, application software suppliers, and other third parties may submit certificate problem reports via Info@techsource.iq

TS discloses instructions related to certificate revocation and certificate problem reporting on a dedicated page part of its public repository.

For any certificate problem report, the reporter is requested to include his contact details, suspected abuse, and related Subject.

⁴ The new certificate status will appear in the next CRL, while the OSCP responder will immediately make this new certificate status information available to relying party applications.

The TS RA begins the investigation of a certificate problem report within 24 hours of receipt and decide whether revocation or other appropriate actions are required based at least on the following criteria:

- The nature of the alleged problem,
- The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular Certificate or Subject,
- The entity making the report (for example, a notification from an Anti-Malware Organization or law enforcement agency carries more weight than an anonymous complaint),
- Relevant local legislation.

In case of deciding that a certificate is going to be revoked because of the certificate problem report, the TS RA executes the revocation procedure as specified earlier in this section.

4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period

There is no revocation grace period. Revocation requests are processed timely after a decision for revocation is made and in all circumstances within the timeframes listed under section 4.9.1 of this CPS.

4.9.5 Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

Certificate revocation requests are processed within 24 hours. For certificate problem reports, TS RA begins investigations within 24 hours from receiving the report. TS RA initiates communication with the Subscriber and where appropriate, with other concerned authorities (e.g. law enforcement). A preliminary communication on the certificate problem is sent to the Subscriber and to the originator of the problem report.

The TS RA performs further investigations involving the TS PKI GB, the subscriber and other relevant authorities (e.g. law enforcement) to decide on the action to be taken on the subject certificate.

If the investigations results led to one of the certificate revocation circumstances listed in section 4.9.1, then the certificate within the timeframe set forth in Section 4.9.1.

Based on the revocation circumstance, TS RA may agree with subscriber on a plan to issue a new certificate.

4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

Relying Parties are solely responsible for performing revocation checking on all Certificates in the chain before deciding whether to rely on the information in a Certificate. TS Code Signing CA provides revocation status via mechanisms that are embedded in the Certificate i.e. CRL and OCSP.

4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency (if applicable)

The Code Signing CA publishes CRLs at regular intervals. The following rules applies for the CRLs issued by the Code Signing CA:

- A new CRL is generated every 24 hours;
- CRL lifetime (i.e. value of the nextUpdate field) is set to 26 hours.

4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs (if applicable)

CRLs are issued timely by the Code Signing CA as per the CRL issuance frequency listed in section 4.9.7 of this CPS.

4.9.9 On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability

This CA offers an OCSP responder that conforms to RFC 6960 and whose certificate is signed by this CA. The OCSP responder avails information immediately to relying party applications based on the CA actions on issued certificates.

The OCSP certificate contains an extension of type id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck, as defined by RFC 6960.

The actual OCSP URL to be queried by relying party organizations is referenced in the certificates issued by the Code Signing CA.

4.9.10 On-Line Revocation Checking Requirements

The OCSP responder supports both HTTP GET and HTTP POST methods.

For the status of Subscriber Certificates:

- OCSP responses have a validity interval greater than or equal to eight hours;
- OCSP responses have a validity interval less than or equal to ten days;
- For OCSP responses with validity intervals less than sixteen hours, then TS Code Signing CA update the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol prior to one-half of the validity period before the nextUpdate.
- For OCSP responses with validity intervals greater than or equal to sixteen hours, then TS Code Signing CA update the information provided via an Online Certificate Status Protocol at least eight hours prior to the nextUpdate, and no later than four days after the thisUpdate.

If the OCSP responder receives a request for the status of a certificate serial number that is "unused" (i.e. not issued by) the TS Code Signing CA, then the OCSP responder responds with a "revoked" status as defined by RFC 6960 (section 4.4.8. Extended Revoked Definition).

TS Code Signing CA monitors the OCSP responder for requests for "unused" serial numbers as part of its security monitoring procedures and any such case will trigger further investigation by relevant teams from TS operations team.

4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available

The Code Signing CA only uses OCSP and CRL as methods for publishing certificate revocation information.

4.9.12 Special Requirements related to Key Compromise

If TS discovers, or has a reason to believe, that there has been a compromise of the private key of TS Code Signing CA, TS will immediately declare a disaster and invoke its business continuity plan. TS will also:

- determine the scope of certificates that must be revoked,
- revoke impacted certificates within 24 hours and publish online CRLs within 30 minutes of creation,
- use reasonable efforts to notify government entities, subscribers and potential relying parties that there has been a key compromise, and
- generate new CA key pair as per TS operational policies and procedures.

Parties may use the following methods to demonstrate key Compromise:

- Submission of a signed CSR, Private Key or other challenge response signed by the Private Key and verifiable by the Public Key, or
- The private key itself.

4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension

Certificate suspension is not supported by this CA.

4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension

Not Applicable.

4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request

Not Applicable.

4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period

Not Applicable.

4.10 Certificate Status Services

Refer to section 4.9.6 of this CPS. In addition, the following provisions have been made.

4.10.1 Operational Characteristics

The Code Signing CA publishes its CRLs at the public repository accessible to relying parties.

The Code Signing CA OCSP responder exposes an HTTP interface that is also publicly available to relying parties.

Revocation entries on a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses are retained until 10 years after the expiry date of the revoked certificates.

4.10.2 Service Availability

The public repository where certificate information and CRLs are published is accessible 24 hours a day and 7 days a week and guarantees an uptime for at least 99.6% over one year period.

The Code Signing CA operates and maintains its CRL and OCSP capability with resources sufficient to provide a response time of ten seconds or less under normal operating conditions.

The Code Signing CA maintains a 24X7 ability to respond internally to high-priority certificate problem report as described in section 4.9.3 of this CPS.

4.10.3 Optional Features

No stipulation.

4.11 End of Subscription

Subscription period is linked to the certificate validity period. The subscription ends when the certificate is expired or revoked.

4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery

4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practices

Key escrow is not supported by the Code Signing CA.

4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices

Not Applicable.

5 Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

This section specifies the physical and procedural security controls implemented by Technology Source within its operations.

The TS PKI GB security management program complies with the CA/Browser Forum's Network and Certificate System Security Requirements, including:

- Physical security and environmental controls,
- System integrity controls, including configuration and change management, patch management, vulnerability management and malware/virus detection/prevention,
- Maintaining an inventory of all assets and manage the assets according to their classification,
- Network security and firewall management, including port restrictions and IP address filtering,
- User management, separate trusted-role assignments, education, awareness, and training, and
- Logical access controls, activity logging and monitoring, and regular user access review to provide individual accountability.

5.1 Physical Security Controls

The TS PKI GB ensures that appropriate physical controls are implemented at the TS PKI hosting facilities. Such controls are documented as part of TS's internal policies that are enforced and verified regularly through internal audits performed by the TS PKI GB on the TS PKI operations team.

5.1.1 Site Location and Construction

All critical components of the PKI solution are housed within a highly secure facility operated by the Technology Source. Physical security controls are enforced so that access of unauthorized persons is prevented through four tiers of physical security. When this layered access control is combined with the physical security protection mechanisms such as guards, intrusion sensors and CCTV, it provides robust protection against unauthorized access to the TS PKI systems.

The computing facilities that host the Technology Source CA services are located in Baghdad, Iraq.

5.1.2 Physical Access

The Technology Source CA systems are protected by multi-tiered (four tiers) physical security measures, with access to the lower tiers only possible by first gaining access through the higher tiers. Sensitive CA operational activities related to certificate lifecycle

management occur within very restrictive physical tiers. The access control system implemented record the passage of people through each zone (i.e., tier)

Physical security controls include security guard-monitored building access, biometric authentication, and CCTV monitoring, protect the CA systems from unauthorized access, these controls are monitored on a 24x7x365 basis, forming multiple layers of protection for individuals entering and exiting the premises.

Access to the premises is granted upon presentation of the individual's National Citizens ID card, which is verified by the security guard, this includes monitoring and registering pertinent information including the person's identity, time of arrival and departure, and provides a visitor badge. Entry is not allowed unless the persons have been duly authorized by a member of the PKI Board and must be escorted by one from TS's trusted employees.

Further, access to the enclave(cage) where the CA systems are hosted is enabled only if two trusted employees are present to open the enclave's door.

5.1.3 Power And Air Conditioning

The design of the facility hosting the TS PKI provides UPS and backup generators with enough capability to support the PKI systems operations in power failure circumstances. UPS units and stand-by generators are available for the entire facility.

A fully redundant air-conditioning system is installed in the areas hosting the PKI systems. All these systems ensure that the PKI equipment continuously operate within the manufacturers' range of operating temperatures and humidity.

5.1.4 Water Exposures

The TS PKI GB has taken reasonable precautions to minimize the impact of water exposure on the TS PKI hosting facility. These include installing the TS PKI equipment on anti-static floors with moisture detectors.

5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection

The TS PKI hosting facility follows leading practices and applicable safety regulations in Iraq, monitored 24x7x365 and equipped with fire and heat detection equipment.

Fire suppression equipment is installed within dedicated areas and automatically activates in the case of fire, and can be manually activated, if necessary.

5.1.6 Media Storage

Electronic, optical, and other storage media are subject to the multi-tiered physical security and are protected from accidental damage (water, fire, electromagnetic interference).

Audit and backup storage media are stored in a secure fire-proof safe and duplicated and stored in the disaster recovery location.

5.1.7 Waste Disposal

All wastepaper and storage media created within the secure facility is destroyed before discarding. Paper media is shredded using a crosshatch shredder. The following procedure applies for removable computer media:

- Authorization is granted for the destruction of any removable computer media.
- The media is erased then physically destroyed if no longer required.
- Record of this media destruction is maintained.
- Media is then be released for disposal.

Cryptographic devices are physically destroyed or zeroized in accordance the manufacturers' guidance prior to disposal.

5.1.8 Off-Site Backup

Full and incremental backups of the TS Code Signing CA systems are routinely performed to ensure ample recovery data is available to restore the TS Code Signing CA systems when required.

At least one full backup and several incremental backups of the TS Code Signing CA online systems are taken daily in accordance with documented backup policies and procedures followed by the TS PKI operations team.

Backups of the most critical information (e.g., Private Keys), is taken at the end of any key ceremony in accordance with a documented key ceremony script.

Adequate back-up facilities ensure that backup copies are transferred to the disaster recovery location where they are stored with the same physical, technical and procedural controls that apply to the primary facility.

5.2 Procedural Controls

5.2.1 Trusted Roles

All members of the staff operating the key management operations, administrators, and security officers or any other operations that materially affect such operations are considered as serving in a trusted position (i.e. trusted operatives)

All personnel appointed in a trusted position have their background check before they are allowed to work in such position. The background check are maintained and reviewed annually.

The following are the trusted roles for the TS Code Signing CA:

- **PKI Administrator:** Owning the credentials of the CA software. Responsible for configuring and maintaining the CA.

- **PKI Operator:** Authorized to execute the CA operational cycle and is involved in critical operations such as subscribers' certification operations.
- **Security Officer:** Owning credentials that enable configuring the HSMs and PKI policies on the target systems subject to key generation during relevant key ceremony.
- **RA Officer:** Authorized to conduct the vetting of the certificate requests as part of the certification request processing.
- **M-of-N Custodians:** Owners of the HSM activation data. Custodians of the Subordinate CAs' safes.
- **CA Domain Owner:** Owning the credential that authorizes Subordinate CA HSM backup and restore operations.
- **HSM Auditor:** Owning the credentials for retrieving the HSM audit logs.
- **Data Centre Custodians:** Personnel who has the credentials for opening the PKI datacentre while performing the CA operations.
- **System Administrator:** Authorized to install, configure, troubleshoot, and maintain the supporting operating system and database environment.
- **Network Administrator:** Authorized to install, configure, troubleshoot, and maintain the supporting network equipment.

5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task

The TS PKI operations follows rigorous control procedures to ensure the segregation of duties, based on job responsibility, to prevent single trusted personnel to perform sensitive operations.

The most sensitive tasks such as the following require the involvement of two persons:

- Physical access to the secure enclave where the TS Subordinate CA systems are hosted,
- Access to and management of CA cryptographic hardware security module (HSM),
- Validate and authorize the issuance of certificates.

All operational activities performed by the personnel having trusted roles are logged and maintained in a verifiable and secure audit trail.

5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for each Role

Before exercising the responsibilities of a trusted role:

- The TS PKI GB confirms the identity and history of the employee by carrying out background and security checks.
- When instructed through the internal TS PKI processes, the facility operations team issues an access card to each staff who needs to physically access equipment located in the secure enclave.

TS PKI dedicated staff (system administrators) issue the necessary IT system credentials for the TS Code Signing CA' staff to perform their respective functions.

5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

The trusted roles listed in section 5.2.1 are established with the appropriate segregation of duties

5.3 Personnel Controls

5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements

Prior to engagement of a TS PKI staff member, whether as an employee, agent, or an independent contractor, the TS PKI GB ensures that checks are performed to establish the background, qualifications and experience needed to perform within the competence context of the specific job. Such checks include:

- Verify the Identity of Such Person: Verification of identity MUST be performed through:
 - Personal (physical) presence of such person before trusted persons who perform human resource or security functions, and
 - Verification of well-recognized forms of government-issued photo identification; and
- Verify the Trustworthiness of Such Person: Verification of trustworthiness includes background checks, which address at least the following, or their equivalent:
 - Criminal convictions for serious crimes,
 - Misrepresentations by the candidate,
 - Appropriateness of references, and
 - Any clearances as deemed appropriate.

5.3.2 Background Check Procedures

All employees filling trusted roles are selected based on integrity, background investigation and security clearance. The TS PKI GB ensures that these checks are performed once yearly for all personnel holding trusted roles.

5.3.3 Training Requirements

The TS PKI GB provides essential technical training for its personnel to effectively carry out their duties. This training is regularly updated and conducted annually for TS Code Signing CA personnel.

The training program encompasses a diverse range of topics and is delivered by a combination of experienced TS Code Signing CA staff and third-party experts specializing in security and PKI. It is meticulously designed to cater to the specific requirements of various trusted roles involved in managing and delivering TS Code Signing CA services. The topics covered in the training are:

- PKI theory and principles
- PKI environmental controls and security policies
- PKI RA processes including vetting and verification procedures.
- PKI operational processes
- PKI products hands-on training
- PKI disaster recovery and business continuity procedures

The TS PKI GB maintains comprehensive documentation of all personnel who have undergone training and regularly assesses the satisfaction levels of the trainers. At the end of each training session, examination tests are organized, and certificates are awarded to staff who pass these tests. It is mandatory for all trusted roles, including validation specialists, to pass these examinations before being authorized to operate as trusted role

5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements

The training curriculum is delivered to all the TS PKI staff members. The training content is reviewed and amended on a yearly basis to reflect the latest leading practices and the CAs systems' configuration changes.

5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

The TS PKI GB ensures that any change or rotation in staff does not affect the operational effectiveness, continuity, and integrity of the **Code Signing CA** services.

5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

To maintain accountability on the TS PKI staff members, the TS PKI GB sanctions personnel for unauthorized actions, and unauthorized use of authority and unauthorized use of systems, according to the relevant human resources policy and procedures, and the applicable Iraqi law.

5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements

Independent contractors and their personnel are subject to the same background checks as the TS PKI staff. The background checks include:

- Criminal convictions for serious crimes,
- Misrepresentations by the candidate,
- Appropriateness of references,
- Any clearances as deemed appropriate,
- Privacy protection, and
- Confidentiality conditions.

5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel

The TS PKI GB documents all training material and makes it available to the TS PKI staff.

The TS PKI GB also ensures that the key operational documentation is made available to the relevant staff members. This includes, at a minimum, this CPS document, security policies, operational guides, and technical documentation relevant to every trusted role.

5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

Audit logging procedures include event logging and systems auditing, implemented for the purpose of maintaining a secure environment. This covers activities such as key life cycle management, including key generation, backup, storage, recovery, destruction and the management of cryptographic devices, the CA and OCSP responder.

Security audit log files for all events relating to the security of the CA, RA and OCSP responders are generated and preserved. These logs are reviewed by the TS security officer team and are also subject to review as part of the regular internal audits performed by the TS compliance function on the TS Code Signing CA operations.

5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded

Audit logs are generated for all events relating to the security and services of the TS Code Signing CA systems. At a minimum, each audit record includes the following:

- The date and time the event occurred.
- A success or failure indicator of the event (e.g. CA signing event, revocation event, certificate validation event)
- The identity of the entity and/or operator that caused the event.
- Description of the event.

Where possible, the audit logs are automatically generated and where not possible, a logbook or paper forms are used. The audit logs, both electronic and non-electronic, are retained by the PKI operations team and may be made available during compliance audits.

Following events occurring in relation to the TS Code Signing CA operations are recorded:

1. Code Signing CA key life cycle management events, including:
 1. Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival and destruction.
 2. Cryptographic device life-cycle management events.
 3. Certificate requests, renewal, and re-key requests, and revocation.
 4. Approval and rejection of certificate requests.
 5. Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists.
 6. Signing of OCSP Responses
 7. Introduction of new Certificate Profiles and retirement of existing Certificate Profiles

2. Code Signing CA certificates and Subscriber Certificate life-cycle management events, including:
 1. Certificate requests, renewals, re-key requests, and revocation.
 2. All verification activities stipulated in this Certification Practice Statement (CPS);
 3. Acceptance and rejection of certificate requests.
 4. Issuance of Certificates;
3. Security events, including:
 1. Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts.
 2. PKI and security system actions performed.
 3. System platform issues (e.g. crashes), hardware failures, and other anomalies.
 4. Security profile changes.
 5. Relevant router and firewall activities (as described in Section 5.4.1.1); and
 6. Entries to and exits from the CA facility.

The TS PKI GB also ensures that the following information, not produced by the Code Signing CA, is maintained (either electronically or manually) by the TS operations team:

- CA personnel, security profiles rotations/changes.
- All versions of this CPS.
- Minutes of meetings.
- Compliance internal audit reports.
- Current and previous versions of Code Signing CA configuration and operations manuals.

5.4.1.1 Router and firewall activities logs

Router and firewall activities logged include:

1. Successful and unsuccessful login attempts to routers and firewalls; and
2. Logging of all administrative actions performed on routers and firewalls, including configuration changes, firmware updates, and access control modifications; and
3. Logging of all changes made to firewall rules, including additions, modifications, and deletions; and
4. Logging of all system events and errors, including hardware failures, software crashes, and system restarts.

5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log

The TS PKI GB ensures that designated personnel review log files at regular intervals to validate log integrity and ensure timely identification of anomalous events. At a minimum, the following audit log review cycle is implemented by the TS PKI GB:

- Audit and Security logs of the CA applications are reviewed by the Monitoring & Compliance team on monthly basis,
- Audit and Security of the online CA systems (Ex. OCSP responder) are reviewed by the Monitoring & Compliance team on monthly basis to validate the integrity of the logging processes and to test/confirm the daily monitoring function is being operated properly,
- Physical access logs and the user management on the TS PKI systems are reviewed by the Monitoring & Compliance team on quarterly basis to validate the physical and logical access policies,
- The TS PKI GB audit and compliance function executes an internal audit on the TS Code Signing CA operations on yearly basis. Samples of the log review reports and collected audit logs since the last audit cycle is requested by the TS PKI GB as part of this internal audit.
- Evidence of audit log reviews, outcome of the review process, and executed remediation actions are collected and archived.

5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log

The TS operations team retains for a period not less than 2 years or in accordance with section 5.5.2:

- CA certificate and key lifecycle management event records (as set forth in Section 5.4.1(1)) after the later occurrence of:
 1. The destruction of the CA Private Key; or
 2. The revocation or expiration of the final CA Certificate in that set of Certificates that have an X.509v3 basicConstraints extension with the CA field set to true and which share a common Public Key corresponding to the CA Private Key,
- Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management event records (as set forth in Section 5.4.1(2)) after the revocation or expiration of the Subscriber Certificate;
- Any security event records (as set forth in Section 5.4.1 (3)) after the event occurred.

5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log

Audit logs are protected by a combination of physical, procedural, and technical security controls as follows:

1. The TS Subordinate CAs systems generates cryptographically protected audit logs,

2. The security of audits logs is maintained while these logs transit by the backup system and when these logs are archived,
3. The access control policies enforced on the TS PKI systems ensures that read access only is granted to personnel having access to audit logs as part of their operational duties,
4. Only authorized roles can obtain access to systems where audit logs are stored and any attempts to tamper with audit logs can be tracked to the respective TS staff.

5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures

The following rules apply for the backup of the TS Subordinate CAs audit log:

- Backup media are stored locally in the TS Subordinate CAs main site, in a secure location,
- A second copy of the audit log data and files are stored in the disaster recovery location that provides similar physical and environmental security as the main site.

5.4.6 Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External)

Automatic audit processes are initiated at system startup and end at system shutdown. If an automated audit system fails and the integrity of the system or confidentiality of the information protected by the system is at risk, the TS PKI GB determines whether to suspend the relevant CA's operations until the problem is fixed.

5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject

Where an event is logged by the audit collection system, no notice is required to be given to the individual, organization, device or application that caused the event.

5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments

The TS PKI operations conduct an annual Risk Assessment that:

1. Identifies foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Processes,
2. Assesses the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, taking into consideration the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes; and
3. Assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology, and other arrangements that TS has in place to counter such threats.

The TS PKI systems and infrastructure is also subject to regular security assessment as follows:

- Within one (1) week of receiving a request from the CA/Browser Forum
- After any system or network changes that the CA determines are significant, and

- at least every three (3) months, on public and private IP addresses identified of TS Code Signing CA core and supporting PKI system. This regular self-assessment activity is executed by security personnel part of the TS PKI operations team.

On an annual basis, and after infrastructure or application upgrades or modifications that the TS PKI GB determines are significant, the TS PKI GB coordinates a third-party independent vulnerability assessment and penetration testing is conducted on the TS PKI systems.

The outcome of the regular assessments and identified issues is made available to the TS PKI GB and PKI operations management, who is responsible for organizing and oversee the execution of the remediation's by the respective teams.

Evidence of the vulnerability assessment and penetration testing activities execution are collected and archived by the relevant TS Code Signing CA' staff.

5.5 Records Archival

5.5.1 Types of Records Archived

The TS Subordinate CAs archives all audit logs (as set forth in Section 5.4.1) in addition to the following:

1. Documentation related to the security of CA systems, certificate management systems, and
2. Documentation related to the verification, issuance, and revocation of certificate requests and Certificates.

5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive

Archived audit logs, as specified in Section 5.5.1, are retained for a period of at least two (2) years and up to seven (7) years. This retention ensures that records are available for investigating potential security incidents or other events requiring retrospection and examination of past activities.

Additionally, the TS Subordinate CAs retains:

- A. All archived documentation related to the security of CA Systems, certificate management systems (as set forth in Section 5.5.1),
- B. All archived documentation relating to the verification, issuance, and revocation of certificate requests and Certificates (as set forth in Section 5.5.1) after the later occurrence of:
 - i. such records and documentation were last relied upon in the verification, issuance, or revocation of certificate requests and Certificates, or

- ii. the expiration of the Subscriber Certificates relying upon such records and documentation.

5.5.3 Protection of Archive

Records are archived in such a way that they cannot be deleted or destroyed. Controls are in place to ensure that only authorized personnel can manage the archive without modifying integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the contained records.

5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures

Only one version of each digital archive is maintained in the primary and disaster recovery facilities of the TS Subordinate CAs. The TS PKI operations team use backup, restore, and archive procedures that document how the archive information is created, transmitted, and stored.

5.5.5 Requirements for Timestamping of Records

All recorded and archived events include the date and time of the event taking place. The time of TS Subordinate CAs online systems is synchronized with the time source of a GPS clock. The time-stamping services setup reaches an accuracy of the time of +/-1s or better with respect to UTC.

Further, the PKI operations team enforce a procedure that checks and corrects any clock drift.

5.5.6 Archive Collection System (Internal or External)

The TS Code Signing CA archive collection system is internal .

5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information

Only authorized and authenticated staff is allowed to access archived material. The TS PKI operations team uses the TS Subordinate CAs backup, restore and archive procedures that document how the archive information is created, transmitted, and stored. These procedures also provide information on the archive collection system.

5.6 Key Changeover

To minimize impact of key compromise, the TS Code Signing CA key is changed with a frequency that ensures the TS Code Signing CA has a validity period greater than the maximum lifetime of Subscriber certificate after the latest Subscriber certificate issuance. Refer to Section 6.3.2 of this CPS document for key changeover frequency.

The corresponding new CA public key certificate is provided to subscribers and relying parties through the delivery methods detailed in chapter 6.1.4.

To support revocation management of issued certificates, the old CA private keys are maintained until all the Certificates signed with the Private Key have expired.

5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

If a potential hacking attempt or other form of compromise to the CA is detected by the TS PKI GB, it performs an investigation to determine the nature and the degree of damage:

- If a CA Private key is suspected of compromise, the procedures outlined in the TS's Business continuity and disaster recovery plan is followed. Otherwise, the scope of potential damage is assessed to determine if the CA needs to be rebuilt, only some certificates need to be revoked, and/or the CA key needs to be declared compromised,
- The TS PKI GB also specifies applicable compromise reporting and relevant communications as part of the Business continuity and disaster recovery plan,

Apart from the circumstance of key compromise, the TS specifies the recovery procedures used when computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted or suspected of being corrupted.

5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted

TS implements the necessary measures to ensure full recovery of the TS Subordinate CAs services in case of a disaster, corrupted servers, software, or data. That is subject to the TS PKI GB authorization to trigger incident recovery procedures.

The TS Subordinate CAs disaster recovery and business continuity document specifies the circumstances imply triggering of incident recovery procedures that may involve the disaster recovery location if required.

The TS Subordinate CAs disaster recovery and business continuity plan is tested at least once a year, including failover scenarios to the disaster recovery location.

5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures

For Subscribers key compromise, see section 4.9.

Compromise of the TS Code Signing CA private key(s), the associated activation data, or the OCSP responder certificate is considered as a mission-critical incident that triggers a process and related procedures, detailed in the TS disaster recovery and business continuity plan.

Considering the criticality of such compromise situation and its impact on Iraq National PKI, the TS PKI GB holds an emergency meeting to take decisions and handles communications as required as part of the Key compromise and CA termination plans. Refer to sections 4.9.1 and 4.9.3 for further details.

5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster

In case of a disaster, corrupted servers, software or data, the TS disaster recovery and business continuity plan is triggered to restore the minimum required operational capabilities of the TS Code Signing CA, in a timely fashion. In particular, the plan targets the recovery of the following services, either on the main site, or the disaster recovery location:

- Certification services (issuance and revocation)
- Public repository where CRLs and CAs certificates are published
- OCSP services

Failover scenarios to the TS disaster recovery location are made possible considering the TS Code Signing CA backup system that enables the continuous replication of critical data from the main site to the disaster recovery site. That allows a recovery of the TS Code Signing CA critical services at the disaster recovery location within a maximum of twelve (12) hours RTO.

The TS business continuity plan defines the following:

- The conditions for activating the plan,
- Emergency procedures,
- Fallback procedures,
- Resumption procedures,
- A maintenance schedule for the plan;
- Awareness and education requirements;
- The responsibilities of the individuals;
- Recovery time objective (RTO);
- Regular testing of contingency plans.
- The plan to maintain or restore the TS Code Signing CA business operations in a timely manner following interruption to or failure of critical business processes
- A requirement to store critical cryptographic materials (i.e., secure cryptographic device and activation materials) at an alternate location;
- What constitutes an acceptable system outage and recovery time
- How frequently backup copies of essential business information and software are taken;
- The distance of recovery facilities to the main site; and
- Procedures for securing its facility to the extent possible during the period of time following a disaster and prior to restoring a secure environment either at the original or a remote site.

5.8 CA or RA Termination

The provision of the TS Code Signing CA services are terminated:

- a) Following a TS's Executive Management decision
- b) with a justifiable decision of the authority exercising supervision (ITPC)
- c) with a final and irrevocable judicial decision
- d) upon the liquidation or termination of the operations of TS Code Signing CA.

If the TS PKI GB and/or the ITPC PMA determine that termination of the TS Code Signing CA services is deemed necessary, the TS PKI GB performs a termination plan that has been previously agreed with the ITPC PMA.

The TS termination plan covers the below minimum aspects:

- Provide a written notice to the ITPC PMA of its intention to cease operating its CA activities, together with a copy of the TS's termination plan, at least ninety (90) days before:
 - the date when it will cease the CA related activities,
 - expiry, when applicable, of TS's authorization for providing its CA activities, where TS has no intention to apply for an authorization renewal.
- TS arrangement for the retention of archived logs (as set forth in Section 5.5),
- The TSP arrangement for maintaining the validation status services URLs as mentioned in the certificates that would still be valid for the applicable period after termination,
- Advertisements about TS intention to terminate its TS Code Signing CA activities within at least sixty (60) days before effective termination or the expiry of its authorization, whichever occurring first, in daily newspapers, or by such other mediums and in the manner the ITPC PMA may determine,
- Communications towards relevant parties and for transferring archived TS Code Signing CA records to an appropriate custodian,
- Plan to assist (as much as possible) TS's subscribers with a transition to another TSP,
- Revoke all certificates, issued by this CA, that remain unrevoked or unexpired at the end of the notice period, whether the subscribers have requested a revocation.
- Undertake the necessary measures to ensure that discontinuing its operations does not cause disruption to its subscribers and relying parties.
- Arrangements to adequately ensure the ongoing maintenance of its systems and security measures for sensitive and accurate data.

6 Technical Security Controls

6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

6.1.1 Key Pair Generation

6.1.1.1 CA Key Pair Generation

The TS Code Signing CA key pair is generated within the memory of an HSM certified / validated to FIPS 140-2 Level 3.

The TS Code Signing CA Key Generation Ceremonies are video recorded and stored securely for auditing purposes.

The TS Code Signing CA Key Generation Ceremonies are witnessed by an internal/external auditor with the aim to produce a report opinion that TS:

1. Documented its CA key generation and protection procedures in compliance with this CPS and the TSP CP,
2. Included appropriate detail in its CA Key Generation Script,
3. Executed in the in presence of a quorum of authorized personnel including representatives from the TS PKI GB,
4. Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the CA key pair was generated and protected in conformity with the procedures described in this CPS, the applicable CPS,
5. Performed, during the CA key generation process, all the procedures required by its CA Key Generation Script.

6.1.1.2 Subscriber's Key Pair Generation

This CA don't provide subscriber key generation services. The private key of a code signing certificate is properly generated by the subscriber, used and stored in a cryptomodule that meets or exceeds the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+.

6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

Not applicable. Subscriber's private's keys is generated by the subscribers.

6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

The **TS Code Signing CA** accepts CSRs (i.e. commands for certificate generation) only if these requests have been authenticated in the web RA portal.

6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

The TS Code Signing CA public key certificates are published on the TS public repository.

6.1.5 Algorithm Type and Key Sizes

6.1.5.1 TS Code Signing CA

The TS Code Signing CA uses 348-bit ECDSA.

6.1.5.2 Subscribers

The subscriber key pair must be not less than 3072-bit RSA.

6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

6.1.6.1 TS Code Signing CA

The CA private and public keys generation is done with state-of-the-art parameter generation. The TS Code Signing CA HSM and associated software meet FIPS 186-2 requirements for random generation and primality checks. The TS PKI operations team references the Baseline Requirements Section 6.1.6 on quality checking.

6.1.6.2 Subscribers

The TS RA uses reasonable techniques to validate the suitability of public keys presented by Subscribers. Known weak keys are tested for and rejected as described in the CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements section 6.1.6.

6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

Certificates issued by this CA contain a key usage bit string in accordance with [RFC 5280]. Refer to section 7.1 and 7.3 of this CPS.

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

For the creation and storage of the TS Code Signing CA private keys, FIPS 140-2 Level 3 certified/compliant hardware security modules are used. The HSMs are stored within the most secure and inner zone of the Technology Source PKI hosting facility.

For the Subscribers' private keys, the provision stipulated in 6.1.1.2 applies.

6.2.2 Private Key (n out of m) Multi-person Control

The TS Code Signing CA private keys are continuously controlled by multiple authorized persons, trusted roles in relation to the CA' private keys (and related secrets) management are documented in the TS'KGC procedures, and other internal documentation.

The TS Code Signing CA staff are assigned to the trusted roles by the TS PKI GB ensuring segregation of duties and enforcing the principles of multi control and split knowledge. Multi-person control of the TS Code Signing CA private keys is achieved using an "m-of-n" split key knowledge scheme. A certain number of persons 'm' (at least two (2)), out of 'n' persons (three (3) persons), the total number of key custodians, need to be concurrently present, together with HSMs administrators to activate or re-activate the Subordinate CA private key.

The TS PKI GB keeps written, auditable, records of tokens and related password distribution to trusted operatives and key custodians. In case trusted operatives or key custodians are to be replaced, it will keep track of the renewed tokens and/or password distribution.

6.2.3 Private Key Escrow

Private keys of the Code Signing CA are not escrowed.

6.2.4 Private Key Backup

The TS Code Signing CA private keys are backed up and held stored safely in exclusive safes maintained in the most inner security zones of the TS Subordinate CAs hosting facility.

Backup operations are executed as part of the TS Code Signing CA key generation ceremonies. The TS Code Signing CA keys are backed up under the same multi-person control and split knowledge as the primary key. The recovery operation of the backup key is subject to the same multi-person control and split knowledge principles.

The overall TS Code Signing CA key ceremony procedure includes the physical transport of the TS Code Signing CA backup from the primary facility to the DR facility. Dedicated personnel in trusted roles participate in the transport operation, which is escorted by security guards. Provisions stipulated in Section 6.2.2 are also considered during the transportation.

6.2.5 Private Key Archival

The Code Signing CA does not archive the Code Signing CA private keys.

6.2.6 Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module

The CA's key pairs is only be transferred to another hardware cryptographic token of the same specification as described in 6.2.11 by direct token-to-token copy via trusted path under multi-person control.

At no time the CA's privates key are copied to disk or other media during this operation.

6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

6.2.7.1 Private key storage for CA keys

No further stipulation other than those stated in clauses 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.4 and 6.2.6.

- **OCSP responder certificate:** The OCSP key pair is generated inside the memory of a FIPS 140-2 level 3 hardware security module.

6.2.7.2 Subscriber Private Key protection and verification

Subscriber Private Key protection

For the Subscribers' private keys, Technology Source ensures that the private key of a code signing certificate is properly generated, used, and stored in a cryptomodule that meets or exceeds the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ by:

- Subscriber uses a Hardware Crypto Module meeting the specified requirement.
- Subscriber uses a cloud-base key generation and protection solution with the following requirements:
 - Key creation, storage, and usage of Private Key must remain within the security boundaries of the cloud solution's Hardware Crypto Module that conforms to the specified requirements in this section
 - Subscription at the level that manages the Private Key must be configured to log all access, operations, and configuration changes on the resources securing the Private Key.
- Subscriber uses a Signing Service which meets the requirements of Section 6.2.7.3 of the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates".

Subscriber Private Key verification

TS RA uses one of the options outlined in section 6.2.7.4.2 of the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates" to ensure that Subscriber's Private Key is generated, stored, and used in a suitable Hardware Crypto Module that meets or exceeds the requirements specified in Section 6.2.7.4.1.

6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key

6.2.8.1 TS Code Signing CA

Private keys are activated following the principles of dual control and split knowledge. The activation procedure uses a PIN entry device attached to the CA's HSMs.

6.2.8.2 Subscribers

Subscribers are responsible for activating and protecting their private key according to the obligations articulated in the Subscriber Agreement.

6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key

6.2.9.1 TS Code Signing CA

Technology Source deactivates CA Private Keys in accordance with the instructions and documentation provided by the manufacturer of the hardware security module .

6.2.9.2 Subscribers

Subscribers are responsible for deactivating and protecting access to their key pair in accordance with the obligations that are presented in the form of a Subscriber Agreement.

6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key

6.2.10.1 TS Code Signing CA

Destroying the CA private key outside the context of the end of its lifetime applies to investigation and special authorization from the TS PKI GB. This destruction decision includes the assignment of the personnel.

The TS Code Signing CA keys are destroyed through documented procedures involving individuals in trusted roles (at least 3 trusted staff members at the presence of at least one representative of the PKI GB). These procedures enforce the principle of multi-person control and split knowledge. These procedures also ensure that the CA keys are destroyed by removing permanently from any hardware modules the keys are stored on.

6.2.10.2 Subscribers

Subscribers are responsible for the destruction of their keys in accordance with the obligations that are presented in the form of a Subscriber Agreement.

6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

The TS Code Signing CA cryptographic modules are certified/validated against [FIPS 140-2] Level 3.

6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1 Public Key Archival

See clause 5.5 for archival conditions.

6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

The TS Code Signing CA certificates are valid for six (6) years, with a key usage period of three (3) years.

The Subordinate CA private key is not used after the validity period of the associated public key certificate. Additionally, it is not used to sign end-entity certificates after the private

key usage period, except for CRLs and OCSP responder certificates for the certificate validity status service.

The maximum permitted duration of validity for Subscriber's code signing certificate is defined in section 7.1.

6.4 Activation Data

6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation

6.4.1.1 *TS Code Signing CA*

The CA private keys and HSM activation data is generated during their private key generation ceremonies. Refer to Section 6.1.1 and 6.2.8 of this CPS for further details.

6.4.1.2 *Subscribers*

Subscribers sets and protect the activation data for their private keys to the extent necessary to prevent the loss, theft, unauthorized disclosure, and use of these private keys. Such obligation is presented to the subscribers as part of the Subscriber Agreement.

6.4.2 Activation Data Protection

6.4.2.1 *TS Code Signing CA*

The TS Subordinate CAs key management policy and ceremony procedures ensure that the principles of multi-person control and split knowledge are permanently enforced to protect the CA's keys and HSMs activation data. During the KGCs, activation data are permanently under the custody of the designated TS Subordinate CAs staff. Refer to Section 6.1 and 6.2 for further details.

6.4.2.2 *Subscribers*

Subscribers protects the activation data for their private keys to the extent necessary to prevent the loss, theft, unauthorized disclosure, and use of these private keys. Such obligation is presented to the subscribers as part of the Subscriber Agreement.

6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data

No Stipulation.

6.5 Computer Security Controls

6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

Technology Source ensures that computer security controls are implemented in compliance with technical standards and vendor security hardening guidelines as a minimum.

Implemented computer security controls are documented as part of the TS Subordinate CAs internal policy documentation.

In particular, the TS Subordinate CAs systems and its operations are subject to the following security controls:

1. Separation of duties and dual controls for CA operations
2. Physical and logical access control enforcement
3. Audit of application and security related events
4. Continuous monitoring of the TS Subordinate CAs systems and end-point protection
5. Backup and recovery mechanisms for the TS Subordinate CAs operations.
6. Hardening of TS Subordinate CAs servers' operating system according to leading practices and vendor recommendations
7. In-depth network security architecture including perimeter and internal firewalls, web application firewalls, including intrusion detection systems.
8. Proactive patch management as part of the TS Subordinate CAs operational processes.
9. The TS Subordinate CAs systems enforce multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of directly causing certificate issuance.

6.5.2 Computer Security Rating

The technical aspects of computer security are subject to periodic audits.

6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1 System Development Controls

Purchased hardware or software are to be shipped in a sealed, tamper-proof container, and installed by qualified personnel. Hardware and software updates are to be procured in the same manner as the original equipment. Dedicated trusted personnel are involved to implement the required TS Subordinate CAs configuration according to documented operational procedures.

Applications are tested, developed, and implemented in accordance with industry leading development and change management practices. No software (or patches), or hardware is deployed on live systems before going through the change and configuration management processes enforced by the TS PKI operations team.

All the TS Subordinate CAs hardware and software platforms are hardened using industry best practices and vendor recommendations.

6.6.2 Security Management Controls

The hardware and software used to set up the TS Subordinate CAs is dedicated to performing only CA-related tasks. There is no other applications, hardware devices, network connections or component software, which are not part of the TS PKI, connected to or installed on CAs' hardware.

A configuration management process is enforced to ensure that TS Subordinate CAs systems configuration, modification and upgrades are documented and controlled by the TS PKI operations management.

A vulnerability management process is enforced to ensure that the TS Subordinate CAs equipment is scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically thereafter. The vulnerability management process supports the processing within 96 hours of discovery of critical vulnerabilities not previously met by the TS PKI operations team.

6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls

Refer to 6.5.1.

6.7 Network Security Controls

Technology Source implemented strong network security, including managed firewalls and intrusion detection systems. The network is segmented into several zones, based on their functional, logical, and physical relationship. Network boundaries is applied to limit the communication between systems (within zones) and communication between zones, with rules that support only the services, protocols, ports, and communications that the TS Subordinate CAs have identified as necessary to its operations, disabling all accounts, applications, services, protocols, and ports that are not used in the CAs' operations.

Issuing Systems, Certificate Management Systems, and Security Support Systems are protected within a highly Secure network Zone.

6.8 Timestamping

The TS Code Signing CA components are regularly synchronized with a reliable time service. The time-stamping services setup reaches an accuracy of the time of +/-1s or better with respect to UTC.

7 Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles

7.1 Certificate Profile

7.1.1 Version Number(s)

TS Subordinate CAs issue X.509 version 3 certificates as defined in RFC 5280.

7.1.2 Certificate Extensions

Technology Source complies with RFC 5280 and the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates” in all certificates it issues. Subordinate CA and end entity certificates for code signing purposes include an Extended Key Usage extension containing key usage purposes id-kp-codeSigning .

AnyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId is not included in the certificates.

7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

Certificates are issued by the CA with algorithms indicated by the following OIDs

Algorithm	Object Identifier
ecdsa-with-SHA384	OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9- 62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }

7.1.4 Name Forms

7.1.4.1 Name Encoding

Technology Source issues Certificates with name forms compliant to RFC 5280 and section 7.1.4 of the Baseline Requirements.

7.1.4.2 Subject Information - Subscriber Certificates

The applicable subject information for code signing and time stamping certificates is specified in the table below. Technology Source issues Certificates where the contents of the Subject DN fields are compliant with their corresponding definitions stated in section 7.1.4 of the Baseline Requirements.

Certificate Type	Subject DN
Code Signing Certificates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • commonName • organizationName • localityName or stateOrProvinceName • countryName

7.1.4.3 Subject Information – TS Subordinate CA Certificates

In the TS Code Signing CA certificates, commonName, organizationName and countryName attributes are present and the combination of these contents is an identifier that uniquely identifies the CA and distinguishes it from other CAs.

7.1.5 Name Constraints

No Stipulation

7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier

Technology Source uses an OID scheme specified for the Iraqis National PKI Policy. Refer to the following certificate template for more details.

Following Object Identifiers are also used:

End entity certificate policies	
2.23.140.1.4.1	Reserved Policy for Code Signing Certificates

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

No stipulation.

7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

Technology Source code signing certificates contain a CPS Policy Qualifier that points to the applicable CPS. Used policy qualifiers are specified as part of the certificates profiles in Section 7.1.10 and 7.1.11

7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

No stipulation.

7.1.10 TS Code Signing CA Certificate Profile

CE² = Critical Extension O/M³: O = Optional M = Mandatory

CO⁴ = Content: S = Static, D = Dynamic

Field	CE	O/M	CO	Value	Comment
Certificate		M			
TBSCertificate		M			See 4.1.2 of RFC 5280
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3	SHA384 with ECDSA Encryption
SignatureValue		M	D	Root CA Signature	Root CA's signature value
TBSCertificate					
Version	False	M	S		
Version		M	S	2	Version 3
SerialNumber	False	M	D		
CertificateSerialNumber		M	D		At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.
Signature	False	M	S		
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3	SHA384 with ECDSA Encryption
Issuer	False	M	S	<Root CA's Subject>	The issuer field is defined as the X.501 type "Name"
CountryName		M	S	IQ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)

Certificate Practice Statement for the Technology Source Code Signing CA

OrganizationName		M	S	Informatics & Telecommunications Public Company	UTF8 encoded
CommonName		M	S	ITPC CS Root CA G1	UTF8 encoded
Validity	False	M	D		Implementations MUST specify using UTC time until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
NotBefore		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time.	
NotAfter		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time + [72] Months	Suggested validity for the subordinate certificate is up to 06 years
Subject	False				
CountryName		M	S	IQ	Encoded according to “ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements”. PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName		M	S	Technology Source	UTF8 encoded As defined in BR.
CommonName		M	S	TS CS CA G1	UTF8 encoded
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	False	M	D		
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	D	ECDSA (OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1)	
				secp384r1 (OID: 1.3.132.0.34)	
SubjectPublicKey		M	D	Value of the key	
Extensions					

Certificate Practice Statement for the Technology Source Code Signing CA

Authority Properties					
AuthorityKeyIdentifier	False	M	D		Mandatory in all certificates except for self-signed certificates
KeyIdentifier		M	D	160-bit SHA-1 Hash of the Root CA public key	When this extension is used, this field MUST be supported as a minimum
AuthorityInfoAccess	False	M	S		
AccessMethod		M	S	<i>Id-ad-2 1 id-ad-ocsp OID i.e., 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 (ca ocsp)</i>	OCSP Responder field
AccessLocation		M	S	http://ocsp.itpc.gov.iq	OCSP responder URL
AccessMethod		M	S	<i>Id-ad-2 2 id-ad-caIssuers OID i.e., 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2 (ca cert)</i>	CA Issuers field
AccessLocation		M	S	http://pki.itpc.gov.iq/repository/cert/cs_root_ca.p7b	Root CA Certificate/Chain download URL over HTTP
crlDistributionPoints	False	M	S		
DistributionPoint		M	S	http://pki.itpc.gov.iq/repository/crls/cs_root_ca.crl	CRL download URL.
Subject Properties					
SubjectKeyIdentifier	False	M	D		
KeyIdentifier		M	D	160-bit SHA-1 hash of SubjectPublicKey	When this extension is used, this field MUST be supported as a minimum

Key Usage Properties						
keyUsage		True	M	S		
	keyCertSign, cRLSign		M	S	True	
Policy Properties						
certificatePolicies		False	M	S		
	PolicyIdentifier		M	S	2.23.140.1.4.1	CA/B BR Reserved Certificate Policy for Code Signing
certificatePolicies		False	M	S		
	PolicyIdentifier		M	S	2.16.368.1.1.1.1	
	policyQualifiers:policyQualifierId		M	S	id-qt 1	
	policyQualifiers:qualifier:cPSuri		M	S	https://pki.itpc.gov.iq/repository/cps	
Extended Key Usage Properties						
extKeyUsage		False	M	S		
	codeSigning		M	S	True	
Basic Constraints Properties						
basicConstraints		True	M	S		
	cA		M	S	True	
	pathLenConstraint		M	S	0	

7.1.11 Code Signing Certificates Profile

CE² = Critical Extension O/M³: O = Optional M = Mandatory

CO⁴ = Content: S = Static, D = Dynamic

Field	CE	O/M	CO	Value	Comment
Certificate		M			
TBSCertificate		M			See 4.1.2 of RFC 5280
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3	SHA384 with ECDSA Encryption
SignatureValue		M	D	CS Subordinate CA Signature.	CS Subordinate CA's signature value
TBSCertificate					
Version	False	M			
Version		M	S	2	Version 3
SerialNumber	False	M			
CertificateSerialNumber		M	D		At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3	SHA384 with ECDSA Encryption
Issuer	False	M		<Subordinate Issuing CA's Subject>	The issuer field is defined as the X.501 type "Name"
CountryName		M	S	IQ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements".

Certificate Practice Statement for the Technology Source Code Signing CA

					PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName		M	S	Technology Source	UTF8 encoded
CommonName		M	S	TS CS CA G1	UTF8 encoded
Validity	False	M			Implementations MUST specify using UTC time until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
NotBefore		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time.	
NotAfter		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time + [36] Months	Suggested validity for the end user certificate is up to 3 years
Subject	False				
CountryName		M	D	Country Name	Encoded according to “ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements”. PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName		M	D	Organization name of the legal entity	UTF8 encoded As defined in BR.
localityName		M/O	D	Locality	UTF8 encoded. Mandatory if the stateOrProvinceName field is not present, optional if the stateOrProvinceName is present.
stateOrProvinceName		M/O	D	State Or Province	UTF8 encoded. Mandatory if the localityName field is not present, optional if the

					localityName is present.
CommonName		M	D	Subject's legal name	UTF8 encoded As defined in BR.
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	D	RSA	
SubjectPublicKey		M	D	Public Key Key length: 3072 or 4096 (RSA)	
Extensions					
Authority Properties					
AuthorityKeyIdentifier	False	M			Mandatory in all certificates except for self-signed certificates
KeyIdentifier		M	D	160-bit SHA-1 Hash of the Subordinate Issuing CA public key	When this extension is used, this field MUST be supported as a minimum
AuthorityInfoAccess	False	M			
AccessMethod		M	S	<i>Id-ad-2 1 id-ad-ocsp OID i.e., 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 (ca ocs)</i>	OCSP Responder field
AccessLocation		M	S	http://ocsp.techsource.iq	OCSP responder URL
AccessMethod		M	S	<i>Id-ad-2 2 id-ad-caIssuers OID i.e., 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2 (ca cert)</i>	CA Issuers field
AccessLocation		M	S	http://pki.techsource.iq/repository/certs/ts_cs_ca.p7b	Subordinate Issuing CA Certificate/Chain

Certificate Practice Statement for the Technology Source Code Signing CA

					download URL over HTTP
	crlDistributionPoints	False	M		
	DistributionPoint		M	S	http://pki.techsource.iq/repository/crls/ts_cs_ca.crl
	Subject Properties				
	SubjectKeyIdentifier	False	M		
	KeyIdentifier		M	D	160 bit SHA 1 hash of the SubjectPublicKey
	Key Usage Properties				
	keyUsage	True	M		
	digitalSignature		M	S	True
	Policy Properties				
	certificatePolicies	False	M		
	PolicyIdentifier		M	S	2.23.140.1.4.1
	certificatePolicies	False	M		CA/B BR Reserved Certificate Policy for Code Signing
	PolicyIdentifier		M	S	2.16.368.1.2.1.1
	policyQualifiers:policyQualifierId		M	S	id-qt 1
	policyQualifiers:qualifier:cPSuri		M	S	https://pki.techsource.iq/repository/cps
	certificatePolicies	False	M		
	PolicyIdentifier		M	S	2.16.368.1.1.3.2.2
	Extended Key Usage Properties				
	extKeyUsage	False	M		

	codeSigning		M	S	True	
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7.2 CRL Profile

CE² = Critical Extension O/M³: O = Optional M = Mandatory
CO⁴ = Content: S = Static, D = Dynamic

Field	CE	O/M	CO	Value	Comment
CertificateList		M			
TBSCertificate					
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3	SHA384 with ECDSA Encryption
SignatureValue		M	D	The signature of the CA issuing the CRL.	The signature of the authority issuing the CRL.
TbSCertList					
Version	False	M			
Version			S	1	Version 2
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3	SHA384 with ECDSA Encryption
Issuer	False	M			
CountryName		M	S	IQ	
OrganizationName		M	S	Technology Source	
CommonName		M	S	TS CS CA G1	
Validity	False	M			Implementations MUST specify using UTC time

					until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
	thisUpdate		M	D	<creation time>
	NextUpdate		M	D	<Creation time> + [1] day + 2 hours
	RevokedCertificates	False	M		
	CertificateSerialNumber		M	D	Serial of the revoked certificates
	revocationDate		M	D	Date when revocation was processed by the CA UTC time of revocation
	crEntryExtension	False	M		
	reasonCode		M	D	As per BR 7.2.2 Identifies the reason for the certificate revocation
	CRLExtensions	False	M		
	AuthorityKeyIdentifier	False	M	D	160-bit SHA-1 hash of the public key of the CA issuing the CRL
	CRL Number	False	M	D	Sequential CRL Number

7.2.1 Version Number(s)

The CA supports X.509 version 2 CRLs.

7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

The profile of the CRL is provided in section 7.2 above.

7.3 OCSP Profile

CE² = Critical Extension O/M³: O = Optional M = Mandatory
CO⁴ = Content: S = Static, D = Dynamic

Field	CE	O/M	CO	Value	Comment
Certificate		M			
TBSCertificate		M			See 4.1.2 of RFC 5280
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3	SHA384 with ECDSA Encryption
SignatureValue		M	D	CA's Signature.	CA's Signature.
TBSCertificate					
Version	False	M			
Version		M	S	2	Version 3
SerialNumber	False	M			
CertificateSerialNumber		M	D		At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.
Signature	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	OID = 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3	SHA384 with ECDSA Encryption
Issuer	False	M		<Subject of the CA issuing the OCSP Certificate>	The issuer field is defined as the X.501 type "Name"
CountryName		M	S	IQ	Encoded according to "ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements". PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)

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OrganizationName		M	S	Technology Source	UTF8 encoded
CommonName		M	S	TS CS CA G1	UTF8 encoded
Validity	False	M			Implementations MUST specify using UTC time until 2049 from then on using GeneralisedTime
NotBefore		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time.	
NotAfter		M	D	Certificate generation process date/time + [12] months	Validity period is 12 months for OCSP Certificates
Subject	False	M			
CountryName		M	S	IQ	Encoded according to “ISO 3166-1-alpha-2 code elements”. PrintableString, size 2 (rfc5280)
OrganizationName		M	S	Technology Source	UTF8 encoded
CommonName		M	S	TS CS CA G1 OCSP	UTF8 encoded
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	False	M			
AlgorithmIdentifier		M	S	RSA	
SubjectPublicKey		M	D	Public Key Key length: 4096 (RSA)	
Extensions		M			
Subject Properties					
SubjectKeyIdentifier	False	M			
KeyIdentifier		M	D	160-bit SHA-1 hash of SubjectPublicKey	When this extension is used, this field MUST be

					supported as a minimum
Authority Properties					
AuthorityKeyIdentifier	False	M			
KeyIdentifier		M	D	160-bit SHA-1 hash of the public key of the CA issuing the OCSP Certificate	
Policy Properties					
keyUsage	True	M			
digitalSignature		M	S	True	
extKeyUsage	False	M			
id-kp-OCSPSigning		M	S	True	
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck	False	M			

7.3.1 Version Number(s)

As per the OCSP certificate profile, section 7.3.

7.3.2 OCSP Extensions

As per the OCSP certificate profile, section 7.3.

8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment

Technology Source organizes an external WebTrust to ensure that it meets applicable requirements, standards, procedures, and service levels at least on an annual basis.

Technology Source accepts this auditing of its own practices and procedures and makes the audit report publicly available no later than three months after the end of the audit period. The TS PKI GB and the ITPC PMA evaluate the results of such audits before further implementing them.

In addition, internal audits are conducted according to an audit plan approved by the PMA. Under special circumstances (I.e. a security breach) unplanned audits and assessments may be conducted on request of the PMA.

8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor

The external audits will be performed by qualified auditors that fulfil the following requirements:

- Independence from the subject of the audit.
- Ability to conduct an audit that addresses the criteria specified in WebTrust standard.
- Employs individuals who have proficiency in examining Public Key Infrastructure technology, information security tools and techniques, information technology and security auditing, and third-party attestation function.
- Licensed by WebTrust.
- Bound by law, government regulation or professional code of ethics;
- Except in the case of an Internal Government Auditing Agency, maintains Professional Liability/Errors & Omissions insurance with policy limits of at least one million US dollars in coverage.

8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

For internal audit, the TS PKI GB has its own audit function that is independent of the TS PKI operations team.

External auditors are independent third-party WebTrust practitioners who will not be affiliated directly or indirectly in any way with Technology Source or any other person with conflicting interests in this regard.

8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment

This CA are audited for compliance to the following standards.

- WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities
- WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Code Signing Baseline Requirements
- WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Network Security –

Refer to section 8.1 for the periodicity of the audits. Refer to section 8.2 for the assessor's qualifications.

8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

Issues and findings resulting from the assessment are reported to the TS PKI GB as well as the TS PKI GB.

Regarding compliance audits of TS Code signing CA operations, any notable exceptions or deficiencies discovered during the audit process prompt a decision on necessary actions. This decision is made by the TS PKI GB with input from the auditor. Should exceptions or deficiencies arise, TS PKI GB assumes responsibility for formulating and executing a corrective action plan. Following implementation of the plan, TS PKI GB initiates an additional audit to ensure that identified deficiencies have been carried out.

8.6 Communication of Results

The overall results of audits are reflected by the TS PKI GB on the TS public repository. The internal audit reports are communicated to the TS PKI GB and are not disclosed to non-authorized third parties.

External audits reports are published on the TS public repository.

8.7 Self-Audits:

The TS PKI GB through its compliance function, monitors and strictly controls its adherence to the procedures listed in this CPS document by performing:

- Self-audits against a randomly selected samples at least 3% three percent of the Certificates issued by the Code Signing CA. in the period beginning immediately after the last sample was taken.

9 Other Business and Legal Matters

9.1 Fees

9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

Applicable fees, if any, are to be agreed upon by TS and subscribers.

9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees

No stipulation

9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

No fee will be charged for Certificate revocation or status information access.

9.1.4 Fees for Other Services

Technology Source may charge for other services depending on business needs.

9.1.5 Refund Policy

No refunds for any charged fees

9.2 Financial Responsibility

9.2.1 Insurance Coverage

Technology Source ensures that the TS Code Signing CA is covered by existing insurance provisions.

9.2.2 Other Assets

No stipulation

9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities

Refer to 9.6.1

9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information

9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

TS considers the following as confidential information:

- Subscriber's personal information that are not part of certificates or CRLs
- Correspondence between and the RA function during the certificate management processing (including the collected subscriber's data)
- Contractual agreements between TS and its suppliers
- TS internal documentation (business processes, operational processes...)
- Employees confidential information

9.3.2 Information not within the Scope of Confidential Information

Any information not defined as confidential by TS is deemed public. This includes the information published on the TS public repository.

9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

TS protects confidential information through training and policy enforcement with its employees, contractors, and suppliers.

9.4 Privacy of Personal Information

9.4.1 Privacy Plan

TS observes personal data privacy rules and confidentiality rules as specified in the present CPS. The TS implements these provisions through the TS RA.

Refer to section 9.4.2 for the scope of private information and to section 9.4.3 for the items that are not considered as private information.

Both private and non-private information can be subject to data privacy rules if the information contains personal data. Only limited trusted personnel are permitted to access subscribed private information for the purpose of certificate lifecycle management.

The TS respects all applicable privacy, private information, and where applicable trade secret laws and regulations, as well as its published privacy policy in the collection, use, retention, and disclosure of non-public information.

Private information will not be disclosed by Technology Source to subscribers except for information about themselves and only covered by the contractual agreement between the Technology Source and the subscribers.

The TS will not release any private information without the consent of the legitimate data owner or explicit authorization by a court order. When the TS releases private information, TS will ensure through reasonable means that this information is not used for any purpose apart from the requested purposes. Parties granted access will secure the private data from compromise, and refrain from using it or disclosing it to other third-parties. Also, these parties are bound to observe personal data privacy rules in accordance with the relevant laws in the republic of Iraq.

All communications channels with the TS preserve the privacy and confidentiality of any exchanged private information. Data encryption is used when electronic communication channels are used with the TS Code Signing CA systems. This includes:

- The communications between the TS RA systems and the subscribers.

- The communications between the TS RA and the TS Code Signing CA systems.
- Sessions to deliver certificates.

9.4.2 Information Treated as Private

All personal information that is not publicly available in the content of a certificate or CRL are considered as private information.

9.4.3 Information not Deemed Private

Information included in the certificate or CRL is not considered as private.

9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information

The TS PKI staff, suppliers and contractors handle personal information in strict confidence under TS contractual obligations that at least as protective as the terms specified in Section 9.4.1.

9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

TS ensures that collected personal information is used for the purpose of certificate life cycle management only as consented by the subscribers.

9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

TS will not release any private information without the consent of the legitimate data owner or explicit authorization by a court order. Refer to section 9.4.1 for more details.

9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

No stipulation

9.5 Intellectual Property Rights

TS owns and reserve all intellectual property rights associated with its own databases, web sites, the CAs' digital certificates and any other publication whatsoever originating from the PKI, including this CPS.

When TS uses software from third party suppliers, this software remains the intellectual property of the product suppliers, and its usage by TS CAs bound by license agreements between TS and these suppliers.

9.6 Representations and Warranties

9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties

By issuing a Certificate, the Code Signing CA makes the certificate warranties listed herein to the following Certificate Beneficiaries:

- The Subscriber that is a party to the Subscriber Agreement;

- All Application Software Suppliers with whom the Iraqis National Root CA will enter into a contract for inclusion of its Root Certificate in software distributed by such Application Software Supplier;
- and all Relying Parties who reasonably rely on a Valid Certificate.

The TS PKI GB represents and warrants to the Certificate Beneficiaries that, during the period when the Certificate is valid, the Code Signing CA has complied with the Baseline Requirements and its CPS in issuing and managing the Certificate.

The Certificate Warranties specifically include, but are not limited to, the following:

- **Compliance:** The Code Signing CA has complied with the Baseline Requirements for Code Signing and the applicable Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement in issuing each Code Signing Certificate and operating its PKI.
- **Identity of Subscriber:** At the time of issuance, the Code Signing CA or Signing Service represents that it (i) operated a procedure for verifying the identity of the Subscriber that at least meets the requirements in Section 3.2 of this document, (ii) followed the procedure when issuing or managing the Certificate, and (iii) accurately described the same procedure in this CPS.
- **Authorization for Certificate:** At the time of issuance, the Code Signing CA represents that it (i) operated a procedure for verifying that the Applicant authorized the issuance of the Certificate, (ii) followed the procedure, and (iii) accurately described the same procedure in this CPS.
- **Accuracy of Information:** At the time of issuance, the Code Signing CA represents that it (i) operated a procedure for verifying that all of the information contained in the Certificate (with the exception of the subject:organizationalUnitName attribute) was true and accurate, (ii) followed the procedure, and (iii) accurately described the same procedure in this CPS.
- **Key Protection:** The Code Signing CA represents that it provided the Subscriber at the time of issuance with documentation on how to securely store and prevent the misuse of Private Keys associated with Code Signing Certificates, , or in the case of a Signing Service, securely stored and prevented the misuse of Private Keys associated with Code Signing Certificates
- **Subscriber Agreement:** The Code Signing CA and Signing Service represent that the Code Signing CA or Signing Service entered into a legally valid and enforceable Subscriber Agreement with the Applicant that satisfies these Requirements or, if they are affiliated, the Applicant Representative has acknowledged and accepted the Terms of Use.

- **Status:** That the Code Signing CA maintains a 24 x 7 publicly-accessible Repository with current information regarding the status of certificates as valid or revoked of all unexpired Certificates;
- **Revocation:** That the Code Signing CA will revoke the Certificate for any of the reasons specified in this CPS.

9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties

TS warrants that it performs RA functions as per the stipulations specified in this CPS.

9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties

The TS implement a process to ensure that each Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use is legally enforceable against the Applicant. In either case, the Agreement MUST apply to the Certificate to be issued pursuant to the certificate request. A separate Agreement is used for each certificate request. The Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use contains provisions imposing on the Applicant itself (or made by the Applicant on behalf of its principal or agent under a subcontractor or hosting service relationship) the following obligations and warranties:

- **Accuracy of Information:** An obligation and warranty to provide accurate and complete information at all times to the TS RA, both in the certificate request and as otherwise requested by TS.
- **Protection of Private Key:** An obligation and warranty by the Applicant to take all reasonable measures to assure control of, keep confidential, and properly protect at all times in accordance with Section 6.2.7.2, the Private Key that corresponds to the Public Key to be included in the requested Certificate(s) (and any associated activation data or device, e.g., password or token);
- **Prevention of Misuse:** An obligation and warranty by the Applicant to provide adequate network and other security controls to protect against misuse of the Private Key and that the Technology Source will revoke the Certificate without requiring prior notification if there is unauthorized access to the Private Keys.
- **Acceptance of Certificate:** An obligation and warranty that the Subscriber will review and verify the Certificate contents for accuracy;
- **Use of Certificate:** When certificates are requested, an obligation and warranty to use the Certificate and associated Private Key only for authorized and legal purposes, including not using the Certificate to sign Suspect Code and to use the Certificate solely in compliance with all applicable laws and solely in accordance with the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use;
- **Reporting and Revocation:** An obligation and warranty to promptly cease using a Certificate and its associated Private Key and promptly request that the CA revoke the Certificate if the Subscriber believes that (a) any information in the Certificate is, or

becomes, incorrect or inaccurate, (b) the Private Key associated with the Public Key contained in the Certificate was misused or compromised, or (c) there is evidence that the Certificate was used to sign Suspect Code. ;

- **Sharing of Information:** An obligation and warranty to, if: (a) the Certificate or the Applicant is identified as a source of Suspect Code, (b) the authority to request the Certificate cannot be verified, or (c) the Certificate is revoked for reasons other than Subscriber request (e.g. as a result of private key compromise, discovery of malware, etc.), then the Technology Source is authorized to share information about the Applicant, signed application, Certificate, and surrounding circumstances with other CAs or industry groups, including the CA/Browser Forum.
- **Termination of Use of Certificate:** An obligation and warranty to promptly cease using the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key listed in a Certificate upon expiration or revocation of the Certificate .
- **Responsiveness:** An obligation to respond to Technology Source instructions concerning Key Compromise or Certificate misuse within a specified time period.
- **Acknowledgment and Acceptance:** An acknowledgment and acceptance that the Technology Source is entitled to revoke the Certificate immediately if the Applicant were to violate the terms of the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use or if revocation is required by this CPS,

9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties

Relying Parties who rely upon the certificates issued under TS:

- Use the certificate for the purpose for which it was issued, as indicated in the certificate information (e.g., the key usage extension)
- Verify the validity by ensuring that the certificate has not expired.
- Establish trust in the CA who issued a certificate by verifying the certificate path in accordance with the guidelines set by the X.509 version 3 amendment.
- Ensure that the certificate has not been revoked by accessing current revocation status information available at the location specified in the certificate to be relied upon; and
- Determine that such certificate provides adequate assurances for its intended use.

9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants

No stipulation.

9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties

Within the scope of the law of Iraq, and except in the case of fraud, or deliberate abuse, TS cannot be held liable for:

- The accuracy of any information contained in certificates except as it is warranted by the subscriber that is the party responsible for the ultimate correctness and accuracy of all data transmitted to TS with the intention to be included in a CA certificate,
- Indirect damage that is the consequence of or related to the use, provisioning, issuance or non-issuance of certificates or digital signatures,
- Willful misconduct of any third-party participant breaking any applicable laws in Iraq, including, but not limited to those related to intellectual property protection, malicious software, and unlawful access to computer systems,
- For any damages suffered whether directly or indirectly because of an uncontrollable disruption of the TS Code Signing CA' services,
- Any form of misrepresentation of information by the subscribers or relying parties on information contained in this CPS or any other documentation made public by the TS PKI GB and related to the TS Code Signing CA' services.

9.8 Limitations of Liability

- TS will not incur any liability to Subscribers to the extent that such liability results from their negligence, fraud, or wilful misconduct,
- TS assumes no liability whatsoever in relation to the use of Certificates or associated Public-Key/Private-Key pairs issued under this CPS for any use other than in accordance with this document. The Subscribers will immediately indemnify TS from and against any such liability and costs and claims arising there from,
- TS will not be liable to any party whosoever for any damages suffered whether directly or indirectly because of an uncontrollable disruption of its services,
- Subscribers are liable for any form of misrepresentation of information contained in the certificate to relying parties even though the information has been accepted by TS,
- Subscribers to compensate a Relying Party which incurs a loss because of the TSP's breach of Subscriber's agreement.
- Relying Parties bear the consequences of their failure to perform the Relying Party obligations; and
- TS denies any financial or any other kind of responsibility for damages or impairments resulting from the TS Code Signing CA' operations.

9.9 Indemnities

Not Applicable

9.10 Term and Termination

9.10.1 Term

The present CPS is approved by The TS PKI GB and remains in force until amendments are published on the TS public repository.

9.10.2 Termination

Amendments to this document are applied and approved by The TS PKI GB and marked by an indicated new version of the document. Upon publishing on the TS public repository, the newer version becomes effective. The older versions of this document are archived on the TS public repository as well.

9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival

The TS PKI GB will communicate the conditions and effect of this CPS termination via appropriate mechanisms.

9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants

Notices related to this CPS can be addressed to the TS PKI GB contact address as stated in section 1.5

9.12 Amendments

When changes are required to be done on this CPS. The TS PKI GB will incorporate any such change into a new version of this document and, upon approval, publish the new version. The new document will carry a new version number.

9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment

Refer to Section 9.12

9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period

Upon publishing on the TS public repository, the newer version of this CPS becomes effective. The older versions of this document are archived on the TS public repository.

The TS PKI GB coordinates communication in relation to the amendments of this CPS and related effects.

The TS PKI GB reserve the right to amend this CPS without notification for amendments that are not material, including without limitation corrections of typographical errors or minor enhancements.

9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID Must be Changed

Technology Source reserves the right to amend content of any published CPS. Any major change of this CPS will not alter the OID of the CPS published in the Technology Source public repository. The OID value corresponds to the current applicable and valid version for the CPS.

9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions

All disputes associated with the provisions of this CPS and the TS Code Signing CA' services, are first addressed by the TS PKI GB legal function. If mediation by the TS PKI GB legal function is not successful, then the dispute is adjudicated by the relevant courts of Iraq

9.14 Governing Law

The laws of the republic of Iraq governs the enforceability, construction, interpretation, and validity of this CPS.

9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

This CPS and provision of TS Code Signing CA' services are compliant to relevant and applicable laws of the Republic of Iraq.

9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions

9.16.1 Entire Agreement

No stipulation.

9.16.2 Assignment

Except where specified by other contracts, no party may assign or delegate rights or duties under this CPS, without the prior written consent of TS.

9.16.3 Severability

If any provision of this CPS is determined to be invalid or unenforceable, the other sections remains in effect until this CPS is updated.

In the event of a conflict between the Baseline Requirements and any regulation in Iraq, the TS may modify any conflicting requirement to the minimum extent necessary to make the requirement valid and legal in Iraq.

This applies only to operations or certificate issuances that are subject to that Law. In such event, the TS will immediately (and prior to issuing a certificate under the modified requirement) include in this section a detailed reference to the Law requiring a modification

of the Baseline Requirements under this section, and the specific modification to the Baseline Requirements implemented by the TS.

TS will also (prior to issuing a certificate under the modified requirement) notify the CA/Browser Forum of the relevant information newly added to its CPS. Any modification to the TS practice enabled under this section will be discontinued when the Law no longer applies, or the Baseline Requirements are modified to make it possible to comply with both them and the Law simultaneously. An appropriate change in practice, modification to this CPS and a notice to the CA/Browser Forum, as outlined above, is made within 90 days.

9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

No stipulation

9.16.5 Force Majeure

Technology Source is not liable for any failure or delay in their performance under the provisions of this CPS due to causes that are beyond their reasonable control, including, but not limited to unavailability of interruption or delay in telecommunications services.

9.17 Other Provisions

Not Applicable.